United
Nations Millennium Development Goals Project,
Task Force
5: Infectious Diseases and Access to
Essential Medicines, Sub-Group Access to
Essential Medicines
Analysis
and Response to WTO Action Regarding Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health*
|
|
Professor
Brook K. Baker**
________________________
* Draft for circulation only (December 10, 2003) – comments welcome b.baker@neu.edu.
** Northeastern University School of Law, member Health Global Access Project.
1.
CONTEXT
– DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ NEED FOR ACCESS TO
ESSENTIAL ON-PATENT MEDICINES FOR TREATING HIV/AIDS
AND OTHER DISEASES
4-7
2.
A
BRIEF HISTORY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
NEGOTIATIONS: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, AND DOHA DECLARATION,
AND THE PARAGRAPH 6 IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT 8-17
2.1 The WTO TRIPS Agreement 8-11
2.3
Unilateral Impasse 15-17
3. COVERAGE OF THE
AUGUST 30 PARAGRAPH 6 IMPLEMENTATION
AGREEMENT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO PRE-EXISTING AND
CONTINUING FLEXIBILITIES IN THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND
THE DOHA DECLARATION 17-40
3.1.1
Pharmaceutical products and diseases covered 17-18
3.1.2
“Eligible Importing Members” 18-21
3.1.3
Eligible importing “regions” 21-22
3.1.4.
“Eligible exporting Members” and “technology transfer” 22-23
3.1.5
Non-commercial motivation 23-24
3.1.6
Conditions on compulsory licenses: quantity terms and
royalty rates 25
3.1.7
Product differentiation requirements 25-27
3.1.8
Other anti-diversion measures 27-28
3.1.9
A procedural morass 28-30
3.2 The Full
Spectrum of Sourcing Alternatives for Developing
Countries
Post-Doha. 30-40
3.2.1
No
patent options 31-32
3.2.2
Parallel
imports 32-33
3.2.3
Article
31(b), (f) compulsory licenses – non-predominant
Quantities 33-35
3.2.4
Article
31(k) compulsory license 35-37
3.2.5
Legal
certainty concerning post-Paragraph 6 Implementation
Agreement sourcing
flexibilities 37
3.2.6
Limited
exceptions under Article 30 37-38
3.2.7
The
Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement 39-40
4.
LEGISLATIVE
REFORM IN IMPORTING AND EXPORTING
COUNTRIES 40-48
4.1 Competition
policy reform 41-45
4.2 Regulating voluntary
licenses 45-48
5. POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS OF GLOBAL FUND AND U.S.
PROCUREMENT RULES 48-55
5.1 Global Fund
policies 48-54
5.2 U.S. EPAR
policies 54-55
6. ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENT GENERIC MANUFACTURE
AND THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIES-OF-SCALE 55-57
7. EMERGING NEGATIVE IMPACT OF BILATERAL AND
PLURILATERAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS ON
POST-DOHA AND POST-PARAGRAPH 6 FLEXIBILITIES 58-60
8. THE MANDATE FOR AN ARTICLE 30 LIMITED EXCEPTION
FOR ACCESS TO EXPORTED GENERICS 60-61
1. CONTEXT – DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ NEED FOR
ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL ON-PATENT MEDICINES FOR TREATING HIV/AIDS AND OTHER
DISEASES
As
recognized by the U.N. Millennium Development Goals Project, the burden of
untreated, but treatable disease in developing countries is staggering.[1] For example, over 40 million people are
living with HIV/AIDS, including nearly 27 million in Africa,[2]
precipitating a global emergency[3]
far overshadowing the SARS scare or the war on terror. Although millions of people living with AIDS
in developing countries need immediate access to affordable antiretroviral
medicines, 95% of them, including 99% in Africa, are living – and dying –
without medicines that have dramatically extended lives in the U.S. and Europe.[4] AIDS is the paradigmatic example, but the
issue of access to on-patent essential medicines is not limited to HIV/AIDS or
antiretrovirals (ARVs) alone. Poor
people in developing countries face a host of infectious diseases, e.g.,
tuberculosis, malaria, respiratory infections, diarrhea, and chagas disease,
for which there is little or no access to medicines, even where cures
exist. In addition to infectious diseases,
people in developing countries contract many, more familiar and equally
untreated diseases including diabetes, asthma, heart disease, cancer, and
mental illness.[5] For these diseases, as common in the North
as the South, there is a wider array of on-patent medicines, including
anti-diabetics, beta-blockers, oncology drugs, and psychiatric drugs, all of
which are critically important to the physical and mental health of poor people
in developing countries and all of which are priced well beyond affordability.
It
is against this backdrop of millions of lives lost needlessly every year that
one must judge the world’s hesitant and often counter-productive response to
the AIDS pandemic and other health problems in developing countries and applaud
the growing movement to catalyze a robust trade in low-cost generic
medicines. The enormous gap between the
need for access to affordable on-patent medicines and its realization reflects
a disconnect between the perceived interests of rich countries in the global
North, including the highly profitable proprietary pharmaceutical companies[6]
that research, develop, and produce patented medicines, and the interests of
developing countries in the global South that require life-saving medicines to
fight HIV/AIDS and other pandemics that are decimating their poverty-stricken
populations. This disconnect occurs at
the intersection of national and international intellectual property regimes,
especially the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),[7]
national and regional capacities to manufacture and market pharmaceutical
products efficiently, and global patterns of income inequality and
poverty. While rich developed countries
continue to pursue intellectual property protections and trade rules designed
to guarantee incentives for discovery and profits for the proprietary
pharmaceutical industry, there is a critical lack of access to medicines
essential to counteract disease and to lower the body count of poor people in
Africa, Asia, South America, and other developing regions.
Developed countries often promote enhanced
intellectual property rights, including those of pharmaceutical producers, as
important to development, where the rising tide of import-export economies will
rehabilitate failed public health sectors and intellectual property protection
will promote local research and development of medicines for diseases primarily
found in Africa, South America, and Asia.
An alternative solution, pursued by developing countries and treatment
activists internationally, is the promotion of efficient generic production by
a sufficient number of manufacturers at meaningful economies-of-scale so that
medicines can be accessed at lowest cost.
To enable trade in generic medicines, developing countries and
pro-public health activists have launched a broad-based attack on intellectual
property rights that hamstring developing countries’ ability to respond
proportionately to their urgent crises and more prosaic public health needs by
making treatment costs prohibitive.
That generic medicines are cheaper than their
brand-name, patent-protected counterparts is undeniable. For example, in February of 2001, Cipla of
India announced a price heard round the world – a standard package of ARVs for
as little as $350/year to NGOs and $600/year to governments in Africa. As more Indian producers entered the market,
prices fell even further, and the quality of the drugs was assured through the
World Health Organization’s new pre-qualification program. This fall, a new benchmark price has been
established by four generic producers, three Indian and one South African –
less than $140 per year for the WHO preferred fixed-dose combination medicine.[8] Accordingly, standard quality generics are
now available for a penny on the dollar of what the major pharmaceutical
companies charge in rich markets.[9]
To enable purchase of assured quality generic drugs,
developing countries and activists have also succeeded in convincing donors to
establish funding structures such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria[10]
[Global Fund] and in agitating for greatly enhanced bilateral and multilateral
donations so that there are reliable and sustainable reservoirs of purchasing
power sufficient to provoke generic entry and to finance purchase of large
quantities of medicine. In this regard,
the promised tripling of the U.S. response to global AIDS, from $5 billion over
five years to $15 billion, may be significant[11]
as is the $1 billion commitment to date from the World Bank’s Multi-Country
HIV/AIDS Program. Although the WHO
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health recognizes the centrality of funding
for AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria in the fight against global disease, it
advocates spending $34 billion a year by 2007 on both general and targeted
health care programs in developing countries.
With this level of funding, the world can begin to reverse the tide of
disease, prevent 8 million deaths a year, and generate $360 billion in economic
benefits a year.
Developed-country
trade policy and pursuit of enhanced intellectual property rights have
complicated a viable response to HIV/AIDS and other diseases where patented
medicines are too expensive for poor countries to purchase. In place of an energetic global reaction speeding
medical care to developing countries, the U.S. and its European and Japanese
allies have enforced a protectionist system of intellectual property
protections that frequently keeps low-cost drugs from people in need. This system, designed primarily to preserve
drug companies’ exclusive access to private sector markets in middle-income
developing countries, often forestalls access to dramatically cheaper generic
medicines for people in immediate need.
The prime example of this imbalanced sense of priorities
occurred in multilateral negotiations that established a uniform system of
international intellectual property rights, the WTO TRIPS Agreement. But even after securing a new international
standard of patent protection in the GATT negotiations, the U.S. continued to
pursue its goal of heightened intellectual property protections through an
ongoing series of trade sanction threats, its stubborn resistance in WTO
negotiations aimed at liberalizing access to medicines, and its pursuit of
bilateral and plurilateral negotiations designed to “ratchet” intellectual
property protections to an even higher level.[12]
Section 2 of this paper presents a critical analysis
of the U.S.’s continued defense of drug company prerogatives and of its
multi-forum efforts to achieve even higher levels of intellectual property
protection. Concurrently, Section 2
reviews the struggle of developing countries to codify greater recognition of
public health issues and to engineer increased intellectual property
flexibilities, a struggle that reached its high point in Doha, Qatar, on
November 14, 2001 when the WTO adopted the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health [the Doha Declaration].[13] Although the Doha Declaration confirmed
member states’ freedom to issue compulsory licenses and to rely on parallel
imports as an alternative source for lower-cost branded medicines, it left open
sourcing issues for poor countries that cannot produce medicines efficiently
through domestic manufacture because of insufficient or inefficient
pharmaceutical capacity. For these
countries, local production is impossible and importation from exporters is
increasingly restricted because of a requirement in TRIPS that countries
bypassing patent rights for particular medicines must produce predominately for
their own domestic markets rather than for export. Thus, Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration required a resolution
to the production for export dilemma by the end of 2002. Despite this deadline, U.S. intransigence
resulted in impasse at the end of 2002, necessitating anther nine months of
negotiation. Finally, on August 30, 2003, WTO members unanimously approved the Decision of 30 August 2003: Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health [Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement].[14]
Section 3 of this paper, its major section,
summarizes the August 30, 2003 compromise on the Paragraph 6 dilemma and then
outlines in detail the multiple options that developing countries have for
accessing medicines from willing producers under the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha
Declaration, and the new August 30 Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement. Section 4 of the paper then outlines the
breadth of legislative reform that developing countries must enact in order to
take advantage of the entire range of flexibilities that they now have. Because developing countries with marginal
pharmaceutical capacity will still face questions about whether to invest in or
subsidize local generic manufacturing or to import essential medicines from
abroad, Section 5 of the paper provides a brief economic analysis of the
prerequisites of efficient generic manufacture and the special importance of
economies-of-scale in securing lowest prices.
Section 6 discusses procurement policies of the Global Fund to Fight
AID, Tuberculosis and Malaria and of unilateral initiatives such as the U.S.
Emergency Program for AIDS Relief [EPAR]that might impact sourcing
decisions.
Gains achieved in the Doha Declaration and in the
Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement risk being undermined because of the
negative impact of bilateral and plurilateral free trade agreements being
negotiated by the U.S. with individual developing countries and with developing
regions. Thus, Section 7 of the paper
highlights negative aspects of recent U.S. free trade agreements and other
trade and intellectual property initiatives.
This section recommends that developing countries insist on removing
intellectual property provisions from bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements
and that the TRIPS Agreement should now be seen as both a floor and a ceiling
on IPRs. Finally, in Section 8, the
paper argues for a simplified Paragraph 6 solution and attempts to persuade
developing country negotiators that they should not settle for the flawed
Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement during their upcoming negotiation to amend
the TRIPS Agreement on a permanent basis.
In particular, the paper argues that developing countries should return
to a simplified Article 30 solution that put them on equal footing with large,
rich countries that can routinely satisfy their compulsory licensing needs
through no-hassle, no-limits domestic production.
2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROTECTION NEGOTIATIONS:
THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT, AND DOHA DECLARATION, AND THE PARAGRAPH 6 IMPLEMENTATION
AGREEMENT.
2.1 : The WTO TRIPS Agreement
The 1994 TRIPS Agreement introduced minimum global
standards for protecting and enforcing nearly all forms of intellectual
property rights: patents, copyrights,
and trade secrets, including those applying to pharmaceuticals.[15]
The Agreement was the result of a decade-long movement by a coalition of
industries in the U.S. that united to secure an international standard of
intellectual property protections that could be enforced through trade
sanctions. Frustrated by the inability
of the World Intellectual Property Organization to engineer global
standardization and harmonization of IP standards, the pharmaceutical, computer
software, publishing, and entertainment industries in the U.S. cooperated to
form their own internal alliances and to lobby business groups to back enhanced
intellectual property protections. This
strengthened U.S. alliance then worked with industry leaders and networks in
other developed countries to motivate the importance of globalizing IP
protections. At the same time that they
were cementing their intercontinental business alliances, these forward
thinking industries convinced first the U.S. Trade Representative and then the
E.U. and Japanese trade representatives that GATT was the forum within which
intellectual property protections should be pursued. Although developing countries tried to create a coalition of the
unwilling, the U.S. used its new Section 301 Special Trade List IPR authority
to discipline recalcitrant nations and to the split the alliance. Reacting to competition from generic
producers, the U.S. and E.U. pharmaceutical industry played a lead role in
TRIPS negotiations.[16]
At the end of the day its principal negotiator stated that the industry had
achieved all of its aims, controlling the process and the content.[17]
The resulting TRIPS Agreement covers basic
principles, standards, and use of patents, enforcement and dispute settlement
mechanisms, and multiple other subjects, many of which are tilted in favor of
intellectual property owners and against the interests of consumers. Under its key patent provisions, member
countries must provide patent protection for a minimum of 20 years from the
filing date of a patent application, Article 33, for any invention, including a
pharmaceutical product or process, that fulfils the criteria of novelty,
inventive step and usefulness, Article 27.1.
Although preceding patent-rule pluralism in both the developed and
undeveloped world had allowed policy-based discrimination between fields of
invention, for example by excluding medicines, Article 27.1 expressly outlawed
such discrimination. Similarly, it was
no longer permissible to discriminate routinely against imports in favor of
locally produced products, thus allowing major pharmaceutical companies to
control the place of production
despite illusory promises to undertake technology transfer.[18] Because of Article 28, the major
pharmaceutical producers secured exclusive rights to exclude others from
“making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing” patented
pharmaceutical products or products made with a patented process. In
addition, Article 39.3 protects undisclosed information (including clinical
test data) from “unfair commercial use,” a provision that may ultimately be
interpreted to impede registration of generic drugs even where patent bars are
overcome.[19]
Admittedly, there are important flexibilities in
TRIPS, discussed in detail in Section 3, including autonomy under Article 6 to
establish international exhaustion rules, which would thereby permit parallel
importation[20] and
authority under Article 31 to issue compulsory licenses[21]
and under Article 30 to grant limited exceptions to patent holders’ right to
exclude competition,[22]
but the undeniable effect of the TRIPS agreement has been to consolidate the
economic power and monopoly privileges of the proprietary drug industry. Given its pre-existing advantage in
conducting research and development (96% vs. 4%), the developed world’s drug
industry secured near absolute competitive advantage over the developing
world’s via the TRIPS Agreement.[23] This advantage will eventually result in the
net transfer of billions of dollars from the impoverished Global South to the
affluent Global North.
At the time of its passage, many public health
specialists in both developed and developing countries seemed unaware of the
looming consequences of a rising tide of patent protection on the treatment of
diseases.[24] However, the burgeoning AIDS crisis quickly
caught people’s attention, especially given the astronomical cost of
triple-therapies brought to the market in the mid-1990’s. As the developing world confronted the
reality of tens of millions of HIV infections and the unaffordability of
billions of patent-protected pills, critics questioned the deal that had been
struck in the Uruguay Round. Early
critics were joined later by more mainstream sources, many of whom offered
their own critique of intellectual property fundamentalism, including the
prestigious U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights,[25]
the UNDP,[26] the World
Bank,[27]
UNTACD/ICTSD,[28] and even
the WTO itself in collaboration with the WHO.[29]
Even after codifying a universal and higher standard
of patent protections for the pharmaceutical industry in the TRIPS Agreement,
the U.S. continued its existing pro-PhRMA[30]
trade policy by threatening developing countries such as Thailand,[31]
South Africa,[32] and Brazil[33]
with trade sanctions because they refused to grant greater TRIPS-plus rights to
patent holders and/or because they proposed using TRIPS compliant means to
access more affordable medicines. At
the same time that the U.S. was engaged in “a full court press” against South
Africa,[34]
thirty-nine pharmaceutical plaintiffs sued the Mandela government challenging
new legislation designed to permit parallel importation of medicines a patent
holder had sold more cheaply in another country, generic substitution in
filling prescriptions of off-patent medicines, and greater price transparency.[35] Fortunately, the trade threats against South
Africa, the now infamous pharmaceutical lawsuit, and the WTO complaint against
Brazil were all defeated between 1999-2001 by a Southern/Northern alliance that
engaged in a coordinated public campaign against U.S./PhRMA policy. As a result of this intense pressure, the
Clinton administration eventually reverse some of its more draconian trade
threats and promised to pursue a slightly more benign trade policy in sub-Saharan
Africa.[36]
As the pandemic intensified and as treatment
activists worldwide demanded a relaxation of the stranglehold patent holders
held over life-saving medicines, developing countries collaborated to demand
that public health be given a more meaningful role in the interpretation and
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.[37] Thus, in April of 2001, Zimbabwe, on behalf
of the Africa Group, demanded that the TRIPS Council convene a special session
on access to medicines. The resulting
June 2001 meeting provoked stark positioning by the U.S.[38]
and E.U.,[39] who jointly
advanced pro-PhRMA positions, but it also resulted in a strong platform by
developing countries that evolved with later submissions to include the
following points: (1) developing
countries have a broad spectrum of public health concerns, not just HIV/AIDS,
and they are particularly concerned about the lack of research on so-called
neglected diseases; (2) patents raise prices and thus impede access to
medicines; (3) developing countries should be free to use existing TRIPS
flexibilities including compulsory licenses and parallel importation without
being threatened by developed countries; (4) least developed members needed an
extension of transitional periods beyond 2006; (5) developing countries needed
to be able to source generic medicines from exporting countries despite the
“predominately for domestic use” rule in Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement,
preferably through an Article 30 limited exception; and (6) developing
countries needed assurances that data protection rules in Article 39.3 would
not impede registration of generics.[40]
Although the U.S. continued to discount the
importance of patent protection on either price or access to treatment,[41]
to insist on limiting discussion to “emergencies” like HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
tuberculosis, and to advocate for restricting parallel importation,[42]
the negotiations took a sharp turn in the wake of the anthrax scare in the U.S.
post September 11. Based on a handful
of deaths and some anthrax-laden letters delivered to government offices,
officials in both the U.S. and Canada threatened Bayer, the patent owner of the
ciprofloxacin, a preferred anthrax treatment, with compulsory licenses if Bayer
could not supply needed quantities of cipro at low cost and in high
volumes. Suddenly, the urgency of
public health concerns became palpable to U.S. decision-makers. In response, the resolve of the developing
world stiffened and prospects for a pro-public health TRIPS accord soared.
Accordingly, on November 14, 2001, WTO members
unanimously approved the Doha Declaration.
Designed by developing countries to counteract continuing trade threats
and a crisis in medical care, the Doha Declaration emphasized the primacy of
public health and the right of Member Nations to take measures designed to
increase access to affordable medicines.
In relevant part, the Doha Declaration states:
|
1. We
recognize the gravity of public health problems afflicting many developing
and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics. 2. We
stress the need for the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) to be part of the wider
national and international action to address these problems. 3. We
recognize that intellectual property protection is important for the
development of new medicines. We also
recognize the concerns about its effects on prices. 4. We
agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from
taking measures to protect public health.
Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement,
we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in
a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in particular,
to promote access to medicines for all. 5. In
this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO Members to use, to the full,
the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this
purpose. (a) In
applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law,
each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in light of the object
and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives
and principles. (b) Each
Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to
determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted... (c) Each
Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public
health crises, including those relation to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria
and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstance
of extreme urgency. (d)
The effect of the provisions in the
TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual property
rights is to leave each Member free to establish its own regime for such
exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFN [Most Favored Nation] and
national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4. |
In addition to
clarifying the preeminence of public health and the importance of access to
medicines and confirming key flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha
Declaration also promised to resolve the so-called production-for-export
problem:
|
6.
We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties
in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS
Agreement. We instruct the Council
for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to
the General Council before the end of 2002. |
Via paragraph 6, all WTO members recognized that
countries with insufficient or inefficient manufacturing capacity would not be
able meet their needs for cheaper pharmaceutical products by internal production
even when they override patents through the issuance of compulsory
licenses. Key transitional time periods
in the TRIPS agreement would soon require worldwide protection for
pharmaceutical products beginning in 2005 even for countries like India that
had previously given patent protection only to pharmaceutical processes.[43] This change in India’s patent law would
dramatically curtail its current lawful practice of reverse-engineering drugs
and then producing them for export.
Instead, post-1995 generics produced in any WTO member country (except
hypothetically in least developed countries) would ordinarily have to be
produced pursuant to compulsory licenses.[44] As previously discussed, Article 31(f) of
TRIPS limits production under a compulsory license “predominantly” to the
domestic market. This then was the
essence of the production-for-export dilemma – desperate demand but no certain
source of future supply.
The terms of a fair and expeditious solution were
repeatedly advanced by the Africa Group and an affiliated coalition of
developing countries[45]
and NGOs[46]. According to this pro-public health
coalition, the production-for-export accord should cover a broad range of
diseases and public health needs, so that medicines for multiple debilitating
and deadly conditions could be accessed more cheaply. Countries should be able to import a broad range of medical
products including medicines, vaccines, diagnostic tests, and other medical
products. Likewise, any country should
be able to make use of the Declaration’s public health provisions, even though
it is undoubtedly true that developing countries had the greatest need. To supply importing countries, any country
should be eligible to be an exporter, though there is an underlying need to
fulfill the promise of technology transfer.
In addition, onerous diversion rules should not be imposed to address
the illusory risk of re-export and sale in rich countries like the U.S. and
Europe that are perfectly capable of reducing or eliminating product diversion
on their own. And finally, procedural
requirements should be minimized, meaning that a limited exception under
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, as endorsed by the WHO[47]
and many other countries[48]
was vastly superior to the proposed U.S. solution requiring hundreds of
product-by-product, country-by-country compulsory licenses in exporting
countries. A solution with these terms,
articulating definite and enduring rights, would have been a huge step in
addressing the crisis of access to affordable medicines in the developing
world.
2.3 Impasse
Nonetheless, after initially agreeing in the Doha
Declaration, the U.S, for nearly two years, blocked meaningful efforts to
liberalize access to generics and in particular blocked an expeditious and
efficient solution to the production-for-export dilemma.[49] The extent of the U.S. blocking strategy was
epitomized in its first two Paragraph 6 submissions to the TRIPS Council,[50]
which proposed the following conditionalities:
(1) a requirement
that export licenses be limited to addressing "grave" or
"urgent" public health emergencies, such as HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria
only (a restriction previously defeated in the Doha Declaration);
(2) limits on the
types of public health products to be covered by the agreement to pharmaceutical
products only;
(3) limits on the
sectors which might be supplied by the agreement, specifically excluding the
private or “commercial, for-profit sector;”
(4) limits on the importing countries that might
benefit from the agreement:
(a)
no application to small market countries that theoretically have
technical capacity
to produce medicines but insufficient market size to achieve
economies-of-scale,
(b) strict
application of the "insufficient manufacturing capacity" standard to
exclude countries where production was theoretically possible but otherwise
infeasible or impractical,
(c) income limits
that would exclude many developing countries, especially middle-tier countries;
(5) limits on the
countries that might export (developing countries only);
(6) a preference
for Article 31(f) compulsory licensing solutions in the exporting
state that
create multiple barriers to implementation including:
(a) prior
negotiation on commercially reasonable terms with the patent holder who might
impose onerous conditionalities,
(b)
costly, burdensome, and protracted individual determinations in administrative or judicial
proceedings to grant each license on a case-by-case basis,
(c) dependency on
the willingness of a third country to go through such burdensome procedures
because of a public health need in a third country,
(d) proof both of a
triggering public health need in the affected country and of technical
incapacity to produce a particular medicine,
(e)
determination of the level of license compensation in the
producing country rather
than in the importing country and imposition of a licensing fee even with
respect to imports into a no-patent country;
(7) strict
anti-diversion guarantees and limitations on re-export, especially to developed
countries, but perhaps
even regionally between developing countries with comparable public health
needs.
According to developing world critics and their allies, each of
these conditions violated the letter and spirit of the Doha Declaration and
each risked undermining expeditious and efficient responses to public health
needs. Although the U.S. eventually retreated on three conditions,[51]
it succeeded in inserting most of them in a “compromise” text agreement
prepared by Ambassador Motta, Chairman of the TRIPS Council.[52] However, because it could not impose further
agreement with respect to its restrictive view on covered disease,[53]
the U.S. unilaterally rejected the Motta compromise on December 20, 2002,[54]
ensuring that a Paragraph 6 solution would not be realized by the end of 2002
as promised.
As expected, developing countries were deeply offended by the U.S.
attack on their sovereignty and by its suggestions that only a few diseases
should be covered by the paragraph 6 solution.
Even though rich countries with ample productive capacity would be able
to issue compulsory licenses on any grounds whatsoever pursuant to the baseline
flexibilities of Article 31, poorer and smaller countries would have options to
address a short list of pandemic diseases and a baker’s dozen of tropical
diseases for which there were few if any medicines.[55] Suddenly, the scales of compulsory
licensing were tilted in favor of the U.S. and Europe, which can produce
on-patent medicines domestically should they so decide, and against countries
like Malawi that have to rely on imports.
These disfavored countries would, according to Northern demands, have to
favor AIDS patients over people with diabetes, or people with malaria over
people with asthma. This imbalance
seemed to violate the promise that Doha was a pro-development round and further
violated one of the bedrock principles of the WTO free trade system and the
TRIPS Agreement, namely that the trading system should not preferentially
advantage domestic producers over importing producers.
3. COVERAGE OF THE AUGUST
30 PARAGRAPH 6 IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO PRE-EXISTING
AND CONTINUING FLEXIBILITIES IN THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE DOHA DECLARATION
Although the U.S. and PhRMA continued efforts to influence developing countries to accede to
disease restrictions, the pro-public health coalition held firm. In the face of developing country
solidarity, the U.S. and PhRMA eventually relented, but only after insisting
that the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement be supplemented by the General
Council Chairperson’s “clarifying” Statement.[56] The exact legal effect of the Chairperson’s
Statement is uncertain, but it is directly referenced in the underlying
Agreement.[57] Of course, rather than merely clarifying,
the Chairperson’s Statement wrapped the Paragraph 6 solution with an even
tighter tangle of red tape. Nonetheless, developing countries must strive to
unravel this tangle in order to access cheaper generic medicines most
efficiently.
Chairperson’s Statement
Although there are many remaining flexibilities for importing
generic medicines,[58]
neither singly nor collectively do they go far enough to ensure an energetic
market in developing countries for generic medicines essential to combat AIDS
and other public health problems. In
essence, and with the benefit of hindsight, one can see that the U.S. has
engaged in a future-oriented, two-part squeeze play designed to downsize the
impact of the Doha Declaration. To
counteract this, developing countries must argue for the broadest possible
interpretations of the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement and to resist all
efforts to implement it narrowly.[59]
3.1.1
Pharmaceutical products and diseases covered
1. For the purposes of this Decision: (a)
"pharmaceutical product" means any patented product, or product
manufactured through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to
address the public health problems as recognized in paragraph 1 of the
Declaration. It is understood that active ingredients necessary for its
manufacture and diagnostic kits needed for its use would be included.
Developing countries did not obtain the desired clarification that
the term “pharmaceutical products” covered vaccines and microbicides, but the
definition was expanded to cover “diagnostic kits” needed for the use of
another pharmaceutical product. Thus,
important blood test technologies are covered.
Likewise, including coverage of “active ingredients necessary for the
manufacture” of a pharmaceutical product is important in order to access
essential active pharmaceutical ingredients where those ingredients are
separately patented.
Developing countries fought hard in the Doha Declaration for the
broadest possible disease coverage by the naming of the Declaration, by the
unrestricted reference to protecting public health in Paragraph 4,[60]
and by the interpretive principles of Paragraph 5(a) which “requires that each
provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in light of the object and
purposes of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and
principles.”[61] Nonetheless, the Paragraph 6 Implementation
Agreement makes reference to “public health problems as recognized in paragraph
1 of the Declaration” rather than to paragraph 4 in referencing diseases
covered by the Agreement. However,
given the tortured nine months of negotiations described in Section 2.3. above,
whereby developing countries firmly resisted any efforts to codify disease
limitations, the only felicitous interpretation of the phrase “public health
problems as recognized in paragraph 1 of the Declaration” is that it covers the
broadest range of public health problems not merely the listed “grave” or
pandemic problems.
3.1.2
“Eligible Importing Members”
1(b) "eligible importing Member" means
any least-developed country Member, and any other Member that has made a
notification2 to the Council for TRIPS of its intention to use the
system as an importer, it being understood that a Member may notify at any time
that it will use the system, in whole or in a limited way, for example only in
the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or
in cases of public non-commercial use. It is noted that some Members will not
use the system set out in this Decision as importing Members3 and
that some other Members have stated that, if they use the system, it would be
in no more than situations of national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency.
2
It is understood that this
notification does not need to be approved by a WTO body in order to use the
system set out in this Decision.
3
Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States of America.
In controlling importing country eligibility, the U.S. and other
developed countries succeeded in imposing four limits on the number of
countries that are permitted to import generic medicines pursuant to a
compulsory license to address a public health need. First, the U.S./E.U. brokered an absolute agreement from
twenty-three relatively rich countries that they would not issue compulsory
licenses for importation under any circumstances. Obviously, many of these countries are large enough and have
sufficiently capable generic industries to issue a compulsory license for
domestic production. But still the U.S.
has succeeded in shrinking the richest part of the international market,
essentially engaging in protectionism at a historic level.
Second, the U.S./E.U. convinced some other, generally smaller or
slightly poorer countries (twelve in all) to agree to issue compulsory licenses
for import only in order to address national emergencies or other circumstances
of extreme urgency.[62] Accordingly, another piece of the potential
market for generic medicines was lopped off, including some countries that have
no domestic capacity whatsoever. Third,
the U.S./E.U., forced ten E.U. accession countries to import only on an
emergency or urgency basis and to relinquish even this right when they joined
the E.U.[63] This will certainly have a devastating
impact on the costs of medicines in some very poor Eastern European countries,
including some that are facing an escalating HIV/AIDS crisis.
The fourth limitation on the eligibility of importing countries is
more subtle and arises with respect to a developing country’s right to
determine that it lacks sufficient domestic manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical
sector. Here requirements of proof,
opportunities for behind-the-scenes pressure, and the possibility of review,
impact the potential willingness of developing countries to make use of
Paragraph 6 production-for-export mechanisms.
Implementation Agreement Provision
|
1.
The obligations of an exporting
Member under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement shall be waived with
respect to the grant by it of a compulsory license to the extent necessary
for the purposes of production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export
to an eligible importing Member(s) in accordance with the terms set out below
in this paragraph: a.
the eligible importing Member(s)4
has made a notification2
to the Council for TRIPS, that ii.
confirms
that the eligible importing Member in question, other than a least-developed
country Member, has established that it has insufficient or no manufacturing
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector for the product(s) in question in one
of the ways set out in the Annex
to this decision; (emphasis added)
4 Joint notification providing the
information required under this subparagraph may be made by the regional
organization referred to in paragraph 6 of this Decision on Behalf of
eligible importing Members using the system that are parties to them, with
the agreement of those parties. 2 It is understood that this notification does not need to
be approved by a WTO body in order to use the system set out in this
Decision. ANNEX
TO DECISION Assessment of Manufacturing
Capacities in the Pharmaceutical Sector
Least-developed
country Members are deemed to have insufficient or no manufacturing
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector. For other eligible importing Members insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities for the product(s) in question may be established in
either of the following ways (emphasis
added):
i.
the Member in
question has established that it has no
manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector; or
ii.
where the Member
has some manufacturing capacity in this
sector, it has examined this capacity and found that, excluding any capacity
owned or controlled by the patent owner, it is currently insufficient for the
purposes of meeting its needs. When it is established that such capacity
has become sufficient to meet the Member's needs, the system shall no longer
apply. [Emphasis added.] |
Pursuant to this provision, least developing countries are
automatically eligible importers, regardless of actual capacity. However, other developing countries are
eligible only if they have no capacity or insufficient current capacity based
on an unspecified form of self-examination.
Moreover, they are required to monitor their domestic capacity over time
such that when the capacity becomes sufficient, “the system shall no longer
apply.” Despite the imprecision of the
“insufficient capacity” requirement, developing countries were originally
pleased that prior notification did not equate prior “approval by a WTO body”
and thus that countries’ sovereign decision-making processes were to be
honored. Unfortunately, the Chairperson’s Statement undermines that reprieve
and provides for ad hoc review of determinations of insufficient capacity that
might deter some countries from using the Paragraph 6 solution.
Chairperson’s Statement
|
Third, it is important that Members
seek to resolve any issues arising from the use and implementation of the
Decision expeditiously and amicably: ·
To promote transparency and avoid
controversy, notifications under paragraph 2(a)(ii) of the Decision would include information on how the
Member in question had established, in accordance with the Annex, that it has
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector. ·
In accordance with the normal
practice of the TRIPS Council, notifications made under the system shall be
brought to the attention of its next meeting. ·
Any
Member may bring any matter related to the interpretation or implementation
of the Decision, including issues related to
diversion, to the TRIPS Council for
expeditious review, with a view to taking appropriate action. ·
If
any Member has concerns that the terms of the Decision have not been fully
complied with, the Member may also utilise the good offices of the Director
General or Chair of the TRIPS Council, with a view to finding a mutually
acceptable solution. Fourth, all information gathered on the implementation of the Decision shall
be brought to the attention of the TRIPS Council in its annual review as
set out in paragraph 8 of the Decision. [Emphasis added.] |
With the Chairperson’s Statement, the U.S. succeeded in imposing a
fourth eligibility barrier that threatens importation for many middle-income
developing countries. Basically, the
U.S. has set up an ad hoc notification-and-review process whereby countries
needing to import generics because of incapacity in their pharmaceutical sector
will be forced to prove and then defend such determinations. The standard for proving "insufficient
capacity" is terribly uncertain. The U.S., in its negotiation
positions, has treated insufficient capacity as a technical term addressing
theoretical physical plant capacity no matter how inefficient or impracticable
local production would be. Similarly,
the U.S. does not acknowledge that an industry may be technologically capable
but unable in the short run to produce a needed medicine or that an industry
may be unwilling to apply for a compulsory license because of an overly
restricted local market.
Developing
countries and treatment activists, on the other hand, have consistently argued
that “insufficient” capacity must be analyzed in pragmatic economic terms to
cover situations where local production would be economically inefficient,
oftentimes because of inability to reach meaningful economies-of-scale. Access activists essentially argue for an
expansive definition of incapacity to mean an inability to produce the
medicines quickly, efficiently, and sustainability on terms equal to or better
than generic medicines sourced on the international market.[64]
Although developing countries have a strong basis to argue that
their determinations of insufficient capacity should be given presumptive
weight and that their obligations to justify their decisions require only
minimum evidence and rationality, the reporting-and-review process could well
deter some countries from risking involvement in a damaging and costly WTO
dispute resolution process. This
prove-it-and-review-it standard does not name countries, but it could have a
deterrent effect on middle-income developing countries with some capacity that
might otherwise choose to import cheaper generics. To counteract this forced self-exclusion from the Paragraph 6
Implementation Agreement, developing countries will need to be aggressive in
making their incapacity determinations and in resisting after-the-fact
micromanagement from the U.S. or other Member states.
3.1.3
Eligible importing “regions”
One of developing countries’ victories in the Paragraph 6
negotiations was a provision allowing developing countries to notify the WTO of
their collective decision to import medicines and more importantly the right of
a regional trade group to trade generic medicines whether medicines were first
produced domestically or imported from a non-regional trade member.
|
6. With
a view to harnessing economies-of-scale for the purposes of enhancing
purchasing power for, and facilitating the local production of,
pharmaceutical products:
i.
where a developing or least-developed
country WTO Member is a party to a regional trade agreement within the
meaning of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and the Decision of 28 November 1979
on Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries (L/4903), at least half of the current
membership of which is made up countries presently on the United Nations list
of least-developed countries, the obligation of that Member under Article
31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement shall be waived to the extent necessary to
enable a pharmaceutical product produced or imported under a compulsory
license in that Member to be exported to the markets of those other
developing or least-developed country parties to the regional trade agreement
that share the health problem in question. It is understood that this will
not prejudice the territorial nature of the patent rights in question; |
An acknowledged rationale for permitting regional procurement and
regional trade in generic medicines was to “harness economies-of-scale.” Accordingly, this provision recognizes the
value of collaboration to enhance purchasing power and the importance of
expanded markets to incentivize local production. Obviously, this provision will be important in the African
context where regional trading groups could easily involve more than 50% least
developing countries.
|
it is recognized that the development of
systems providing for the grant of regional patents to be applicable in the
above Members should be promoted. To this end, developed country Members
undertake to provide technical cooperation in accordance with Article 67 of
the TRIPS Agreement, including in conjunction with other relevant
intergovernmental organizations. |
One of the unfortunate trade-offs in this regional trade
provision, however, is developing countries’ agreement that a regional patent
system is desirable. Of course, there
are already two regional patent agreements in Africa.[65] Moreover, it is important for developing
countries to try to conserve their administrative resources and to avoid overly
duplicative structures between similarly situated members. However, it is by no means certain that
harmonization of patent standards will inure to the long-term benefit of
developing countries despite the efforts of the World Intellectual Property
Organization to achieve the same.[66] This is particularly true since the
“technical assistance” provided by developed countries is so often
patent-enhancing. The details of patent
harmonization, even on an expanded regional basis, should be approached with
great caution.
3.1.4. “Eligible
exporting Members” and “technology transfer”
|
1.(c) "exporting
Member" means a Member using the system set out in this Decision to produce pharmaceutical products for, and export
them to, an eligible importing Member. |
The definition of exporting Member is broad enough to include any
WTO member. This represents a partial
victory for developing countries which did not want to be limited to an
unnecessarily restricted list of potential suppliers. Pursuant to this new-found authority, both Canada and the
European Commission are pursuing legislation authorizing
production-for-export. On the other
hand, developing countries had also argued vigorously for enhancements in local
capacity to produce medicines and thus had argued for technology transfers and
other assistance to help development of that capacity. Gains in this area were meager and
contradictory.
|
2. Members
recognize the desirability of promoting the transfer of technology and
capacity building in the pharmaceutical sector in order to overcome the
problem identified in paragraph 6 of the Declaration. To this end, eligible
importing Members and exporting Members are encouraged to use the system set
out in this Decision in a way which would promote this objective. Members
undertake to cooperate in paying special attention to the transfer of
technology and capacity building in the pharmaceutical sector in the work to
be undertaken pursuant to Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, paragraph 7 of
the Declaration and any other relevant work of the Council for TRIPS. |
Undoubtedly technology transfer is an important issue for
developing countries and it had received little real commitment from developed
countries. Indeed most evidence
post-TRIPS is that manufacturing capacity in developing countries has been
reduced as major producers shut down smaller in-country “finishing factories”
that were established to satisfy pre-TRIPS local-working requirements. However, the focus on technology transfer is
a double-edged sword. Local production
within a country or region can fulfill employment, industrial-policy, and
development goals; it can synergistically build technical capacity re
manufacturing processes; it can ease procurement and distribution problems,
contribute to the local tax base, and decrease demand for foreign currency
reserves and import financing, though in most instances active ingredients and
expertise will still be imported. On
the other hand, there may be inefficiencies in local production and therefore real
cost disadvantages. Moreover, developing
countries should be cautious about over-investment or over-reliance on local
production options, especially since so many countries are hoping to become
regional suppliers in Africa. Exactly
how many generic drug companies in Africa can become cost-effective and
price-competitive producers for the region?[67] The Clinton Foundation’s ARV agreement with
Aspen Pharmacare of South Africa suggests that some African generics can
compete with Cipla, Ranbaxy, and Matrix, three Indian producers, but should each
African country be wooed into imagining itself as a significant player in the
regional market for essential generic medicines?
Answering this question depends in part on the economics of viable
generic manufacturing (discussed in sub-section 5, infra), but developing countries should also be leery of whether
the U.S. and other developed countries will use developing countries’ early
attempts to establish generic capacity against them. Since the previous discussion of the Paragraph 6 Implementation
Agreement already highlighted the fact that the U.S. has a very narrow
technical interpretation of productive capacity, developing countries might
soon see themselves shut out, or at least challenged, should they try to switch
options and seek imports of other on-patent generic medicines from abroad under
the Paragraph 6 accord. In other words,
inefficient and thus unsustainable local capacity might haunt developing
countries’ subsequent resort to alternative, superior sourcing options.
3.1.5 Non-commercial motivation
|
Members recognize
that the system that will be established by the Decision should be used in
good faith to protect public health and, without prejudice to paragraph 6 of
the Decision, not be an instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy
objectives.[68] |
Questions have been raised whether the
Chairperson’s Statement directly restricts generic exporters’ right to make a
profit or whether it has alternative meanings.[69] In particular, commentators are concerned
whether an exporting nation like India will be permitted to support the export
market by making ready use of the Paragraph 6 Agreement to issue compulsory
licenses for export. The U.S. and
pharmaceutical interests originally argued (as late as August 2003) that export
should be on “humanitarian” grounds only, meaning not for commercial profit.[70] Because of public outcry, however, the U.S.
eventually agreed to allow the language to be changed from
"humanitarian" to that in the Chairperson’s Statement: “the
Decision should be used in good faith to protect public health and … not as an
instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy objectives."
Given this language and given PhRMA’s
historic concern about competition from Indian generics, it is quite likely
that the U.S. will continue to argue that developing countries should not enter
the export/compulsory license business if they do so in order to develop a
competitive pharmaceutical industry and thereby gain comparative advantage in
international trade. In light of the U.S.’s
concern over diversion, however, it is also possible that the U.S. is seeking
to clarify that the ultimate destination of exported medicines must remain in
the Global South and that drugs must not be re-exported through parallel
importation or otherwise to the U.S. and E.U.; otherwise, the re-exporter would
be pursuing industrial or commercial policy (namely making money on
re-export). A final plausible
interpretation of the “industrial or commercial policy objective” clause is
that the U.S. is trying to resurrect the private sector limitation that it had
originally proposed pre-Doha. A close
analysis of the U.S. position suggests that it is primarily interested in
deterring the emergence of an even stronger pharmaceutical sector in India.
In rebuttal to the U.S.’s preferred
interpretation, public health and access advocates argue that no generic
company is going to sell for long on a no-profit basis. For the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement
to work at all, countries like India, and hopefully China, South Africa,
Thailand, and Brazil, will have to become even bigger players in the production
and export of generic medicines.
However, every time one of these exporting countries issues a compulsory
license for export it would arguably be advancing an industrial and commercial
policy of actually enabling a generic manufacturer to provide a sustainable
source of supply of standard-quality, low-cost generics to countries that
cannot product medicines efficiently on their own. One could wish that the generic industry were altruistic enough
to make HIV/AIDS and other medicines on a nonprofit basis, despite investing in
productive capacity, fixed-dose combinations, and drug registration. But even the new Clinton Foundation offer of
$140 a year is premised on some slim margin of profit and a certain quantum of
guaranteed purchases.[71]
3.1.6. Conditions
on compulsory licenses: quantity terms
and royalty rates
|
2.(b) the compulsory license issued by the exporting Member under
this Decision shall contain the following conditions: i.
only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing
Member(s) may be manufactured under the license and the entirety of this
production shall be exported to the Member(s) which has notified its needs to
the Council for TRIPS; 3. Where a compulsory license is granted by
an exporting Member under the system set out in this Decision, adequate
remuneration pursuant to Article 31(h) of the TRIPS Agreement shall be paid
in that Member taking into account the economic value to the importing Member
of the use that has been authorized in the exporting Member. Where a
compulsory license is granted for the same products in the eligible importing
Member, the obligation of that Member under Article 31(h) shall be waived in
respect of those products for which remuneration in accordance with the first
sentence of this paragraph is paid in the exporting Member.[72] |
The Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement directly limits the
quantity of medicines that can be produced for export by requiring that only an
amount necessary to meet notified needs of all eligible Members shall be
manufactured and that all medicines produced under the export license shall be
exported rather than be sold domestically.
Fortunately, there is clarity in this provision that supply totals can
be aggregated to include authorized demand from regional trade groups.
The second necessary condition on the license is a
counter-intuitive obligation that the amount of royalty compensation be set in
the exporting country rather than the importing country and that it be set
according to the “economic value to the importing Member of the [authorized
use].” At first blush, this provision
would seem to require exporting Members to rigorously investigate “economic
value” in the importing country. The
more rational interpretation, however, is to recognize that the value need be
only roughly proportional to importing-country GDP, degree of innovation,
public vs. private research and development costs, prior earnings, remaining life of the
patent, purpose of use, and perhaps other
factors. An even more rational solution
is that the exporting country set a narrow range of presumptive royalty rates
in line with common practice.
An added paradox of this remuneration requirement is that it
requires a royalty even if product is being produced for a country where the
medicine is not patented. In this
regard, an importing poor country is worse off under the Paragraph 6
Implementation Agreement than it would have been if it had local capacity to
produce medicines. As the ultimate
consumer, the importing, no-patent Member will be required to pay the added
cost of a license royalty even though there would have been no royalty on locally
produced medicines. This is yet another
example of how the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement is unfairly biased
against generic imports.
3.1.7 Product
differentiation requirements
|
3.
the compulsory license issued by the exporting Member under this
Decision shall contain the following conditions: ii.
products produced under the license shall be clearly identified as
being produced under the system set out in this Decision through specific
labeling or marking. Suppliers should distinguish such products through
special packaging and/or special colouring/shaping of the products
themselves, provided that such distinction is feasible and does not have a
significant impact on price;[73] |
The Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement contained a compromise on
product differentiation. Developed countries
and pharmaceutical interests had sought strong differentiation requirements so
that there would be less temptation to divert nearly identical products from
developing countries to more lucrative developed country markets. Developing countries, in contrast, worried
about the economic impact of product differentiation and won concessions that
such differentiation would not be required if it had “a significant impact on
price.” The U.S./PhRMA team, however,
remained unsatisfied with this compromise and thus insisted on the insertion of
the following language in the Chairman’s Statement.
|
Members recognize that the purpose of
the Decision would be defeated if products supplied under this Decision are
diverted from the markets for which they are intended. … It is the
understanding of Members that in general special packaging and/or special
colouring or shaping should not have a
significant impact on the price of pharmaceuticals. [Emphasis added.] In the past, companies have developed
procedures to prevent diversion of products that are, for example, provided
through donor programmes. “Best practices” guidelines that draw upon the
experiences of companies are attached to this statement for illustrative
purposes. Members and producers are encouraged to draw from and use these
practices, and to share information on their experiences in preventing
diversion. Attachment: “Best practices” guidelines ·
Bristol Myers
Squibb used different markings/imprints on capsules supplied to sub Saharan
Africa. ·
Novartis has used different
trademark names, one (Riamet®) for an anti-malarial drug provided to
developed countries, the other (Coartem®) for the same products supplied to
developing countries. Novartis further differentiated the products through
distinctive packaging. ·
GlaxoSmithKline
(GSK) used different outer packaging for its HIV/AIDS medications Combivir,
Epivir and Trizivir supplied to developing countries. GSK further
differentiated the products by embossing the tablets with a different number
than tablets supplied to developed countries, and plans to further
differentiate the products by using different colours. ·
Merck
differentiated its HIV/AIDS antiretroviral medicine CRIXIVAN through special
packaging and labelling, i.e., gold-ink printing on the capsule, dark green bottle
cap and a bottle label with a light-green background. ·
Pfizer used
different colouring and shaping for Diflucan pills supplied to South Africa. Producers have further
minimized diversion by entering into contractual arrangements with importers/ distributors to ensure delivery of
products to the intended markets. |
Any requirement that exporters vary pill size, shape, and color is
not cost-free, particularly when moving from round, white tablets or capsules
of a standard size, to hexagogonal pills in different sizes and colors.[75] Although it may be sensible to have
protections against using a proprietary name or identical packaging (possible
trade mark infringements), there is no sense in adding dramatically to costs
(and potentially altering bio-equivalence or bio-availability) by changing
size, coating, and shape. This
unnecessary added cost burden is especially egregious when producers might have
to change trade dress, size, and shape for multiple small markets.[76]
Although the Chairperson’s Statement adds a presumption that
product differentiation does not adversely affect costs, developing countries
and generic producers should be prepared to argue and document that they
do. Even more significantly, if product
differentiation affects bio-availability or bio-equivalence, they should argue
that the differentiation is “infeasible” as well as uneconomical under the
Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement.
Finally, developing countries should select the “best practices” with
the least onerous terms, i.e., Novartis.
3.1.8 Other
anti-diversion measures
|
4. In order to
ensure that the products imported under the system set out in this Decision
are used for the public health purposes underlying their importation,
eligible importing Members shall take reasonable
measures within their means, proportionate to their administrative capacities
and to the risk of trade diversion to prevent re-exportation of the
products that have actually been imported into their territories under the
system. In the event that an eligible importing Member that is a developing
country Member or a least-developed country Member experiences difficulty in
implementing this provision, developed country Members shall provide, on
request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and financial
cooperation in order to facilitate its implementation. [Emphasis added.] 5. Members shall
ensure the availability of effective legal means to prevent the importation
into, and sale in, their territories of products produced under the system
set out in this Decision and diverted to their markets inconsistently with
its provisions, using the means already required to be available under the
TRIPS Agreement. If any Member considers that such measures are proving
insufficient for this purpose, the matter may be reviewed in the Council for
TRIPS at the request of that Member.[77] |
The Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement requires importing
Members to “take reasonable measures within their means, proportionate to their
administrative capacity and to the risk of trade diversion to prevent
re-exportation.” Should their efforts
to prevent re-exportation be “difficult,” then developing countries are
obligated to seek mutually agreeable technical and financial cooperation from
developed country Members. Although
this language imposes no directly enforceable obligations on importing Members
with respect to any particular anti-diversion measure, it does suggest that
pressure will be brought to bear regarding methods designed to reduce product
diversion.
In addition to requiring product differentiation and
administrative efforts against product diversion, the Paragraph 6
Implementation Agreement also requires a series of notifications from importing
and exporting countries and the licensee concerning the identity of the
licensed generic producer, the identity and quantities of drugs being produced and
exported, and the distinguishing features of the products.[78] Presumably this elaborative system of
publicly available notifications is at least partially designed to enable
proprietary drug companies to police product diversion.
3.1.9 A procedural morass
The Paragraph 6 notification scheme is elaborate
enough, but it builds on the procedural complexity of double-licensing under
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.
Under the discipline of the combined texts, in order to import medicines
in a country where a drug has been patented, the following steps must be
followed for a “routine” pro-public health license:
(1)
The
importing country’s potential licensee(s) must seek a voluntary license[79]
on commercially reasonable terms for a commercially reasonable period of time
from the patent holder.[80]
The importing country can ease this requirement by specifying a relatively
short time for negotiations, e.g., 30 days, and by specifying presumptively
reasonable and unreasonable terms (see discussion on regulation of voluntary
licenses, subsection 4.2 infra).
(2)
Failing
that, the potential licensee(s) must apply for a compulsory license from the
importing country pursuant to procedures satisfying Article 31 of the TRIPS
Agreement, including individual determinations, 31(a), limited scope and
duration, 31(c) and (g),[81]
non-exclusivity and non-assignability, 31(d) and (e), and rights of review,
31(i) and (j).
(3)
The
importing country must assess its generic industry’s capacity and/or
willingness to produce the medicine locally, and, if capacity is insufficient,
it must notify the WTO of its decision or intention to issue a compulsory
license, specify the names and expected quantities of the products needed[82]
and explain and justify its rationale concerning insufficient capacity, which
rationale is subject to ad hoc challenge and review.[83]
(4)
The
importing country must license the potential exporter, presumably the one that
has already engaged in voluntary license negotiations in the importing country,
Article 31(b).
(5)
The
exporter may need to seek a voluntary license on commercially reasonable terms
for a commercially reasonable period of time in the exporting country, though
this requirement is needlessly duplicative and irrational.[84]
(6)
The
exporter must seek a fully TRIPS-compulsory license from its own government on
a single-country, single-product basis, Article 31(a), (c), (d), (e), (g), (i),
(j).
(7)
Compensation
by royalty must be individually determined based on economic value in the
importing country.[85]
(8)
“The
exporting Member shall notify the TRIPS Council of the grant of the license,
including the conditions attached to it.
The information provided shall include the name and address of the
licensee, the product(s) for which the licence has been granted, the
quantity(ies) for which it has been granted, the country(ies) to which the
product(s) is (are) to be supplied and the duration of the license. The notification shall also indicate the
address of the website [upon which the licensee posts its required
notifications].” [86]
(9)
If
a license is granted, the exporter must investigate pill size, shape, coloring,
labeling, and packaging of the patent-holder’s product in the importing country
and differentiate its new product in material respects, unless to do so is
demonstrably too costly or infeasible.
(10)
Likewise,
the licensee must post certain required information on a website before
shipping detailing: “the quantities
being supplied to each destination … and the distinguishing features of the
product(s).”[87]
(11)
The
generic producer will need to seek product registration and prove
bio-equivalence in the importing country despite the patent holder’s effort to
prevent “unfair commercial use” of its confidential registration data (TRIPS
Article 39.3).
(12)
This
process must be fulfilled over and over again for each and every drug and for
each and every country to which or from which the drug will be exported.
Shrink the market, increase costs, and add burdensome procedural
requirements - is that the simple and efficient solution promised at Doha? The answer is obviously no. The demand-end of the developed-country,
post-Doha strategy was designed to dramatically shrink the potential market for
generic drugs and to exclude virtually all markets with meaningful and stable
purchasing power. At the supply end,
developed countries succeeded in increasing the risks and costs of producing
generic medicines for export and in reducing the benefits. In part, the risk factors and reduced
benefits for generic producers include shrinking markets. But, in addition, generic producers will be
uncertain whether a particular country has properly determined that it lacks
sufficient pharmaceutical capacity or whether there is a public health need –
decisions that can result in review by the WTO and might also prompt lawsuits
by patent-holders such as that previously filed against South Africa.[88] Even more problematic, however, is the
procedural labyrinth that stands between a country desperately needing imported
generics and a willing manufacturer where the drug is on-patent.
Unfortunately and for reasons are that hard to fathom, developing
countries traded their citizens' health for long-promised and
indefinitely-delayed reductions in farm export subsidizes and/or for temporary
access to developed countries’ textile markets (before an even cheaper producer
arrives on the scene). Although
culpability for the incredible shrinking Doha Declaration rests primarily with
the U.S. (and secondarily with the E.U. and Japan), developing countries became
co-complicit in enforcing a pharmaceutical embargo that risks millions of
unnecessary deaths.
Despite this critique, both of the
Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement and of developing countries’ premature
capitulation to developed country power, developing countries held firm on the
scope of disease issue, on securing import/re-export rights for regional trade
alliances, and on market exclusivity during extended transitional periods for
least developed countries.[89] It is also true that one loophole in the
TRIPS agreement, the “predominantly for domestic use rule” was widened somewhat
as a result of the August 30 accord.
3.2 The Full Spectrum of Sourcing Alternatives
for Developing Countries Post-Doha
Fortunately, as demonstrated in Chart
One below, developing countries retain a great deal of flexibility to use
TRIPS-compliant mechanisms to access medicines from abroad, despite the
Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement though those some of these options will
narrow in the future. In this regard, it is
important to note at the outset that there are now four nestled texts – the
original TRIPS Agreement, the subsequent Doha Declaration, the Paragraph 6
Implementation Agreement, and the Chairperson’s Statement – which regulate the
production and export of generic medicines and their importation. In this regard, it is also important to
remember that options within a particular country will also be circumscribed by
national legislation and perhaps by its participation in bilateral or regional
trade agreements that limit rights it might otherwise have under the four
international agreements referenced above.
3.2.1 No patent options
Many
different kinds of exporters are currently permitted to sell generics for
export where they are not covered by patent protection in the exporting
countries. Countries permitted to
export, depending on their own national legislation, include:
(1)
non-WTO members that can produce and export medicines without WTO
complications because of their non-membership, though they might have national
legislation protecting patents which would forestall their rights to produce
and export generic versions of patented medicines;
(2)
least developed countries that do not have to provide patent
protection for pharmaceutical products or processes until 2016, although many
do so prematurely or under pressure; again national legislation should be
amended to permit such production and export;
(3)
countries that did not start granting patents on medicines until
compelled to do so by the TRIPS Agreement and thus who can make generic
versions of pre-1995 drugs legally even without a compulsory license; and
(4)
countries like India, who did not have patent production for
pharmaceutical "products" in 1994 but only for pharmaceutical
“processes” and thus have until 2005 to become fully TRIPS-compliant.
In
the meantime and into the future, India can continue to make lawful copies of
pre-1995 medicines for export without restriction and will continue to be able
to do so indefinitely – the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement and the
Chairman's Statement arguably have nothing to do with this. The story for post-1995 medicines is more
complicated because of a “mailbox rule” in Article 70 of the TRIPS Agreement. Under the so-called "mailbox" rule
countries like India that are supposed to hold post-1995 patent applications in
a “mailbox” pending their TRIPS compliance in 2005. At that time, the patent application would be given priority and
the patent, if granted, would extend for the remainder of its 20-year
term. Moreover, even while the patent
application is waiting in the “mailbox,” the patent holder is supposed to be
given five years of marketing exclusivity once the product has been registered
for distribution by the country’s medicines registration agency. India has just granted its first exclusive
marketing rights to a “mailbox” cancer drug, Glivec. Fourteen other pipeline applications have been filed but several,
including Roche’s Saquinavir, have been rejected for not fulfilling the
required criteria.[90]
|
Brazilian/Indian Example In September of 2003, Brazil took the first steps towards issuing a compulsory license to import generic antiretroviral drugs from India. It did so by means of a presidential decree that created a juridical mechanism for generic importation in the case of national emergency or national interest. Through negotiations with Abbott Laboratories, Merck & Co. and Roche, proprietary owners of Lopinavir, Efavirez, and Nelfinavir respectively, Brazil was seeking cheaper sources of supply because it was spending 63% of its $573 million ARV budget on these three medicines alone. On November 19, 2003, only Merck had settled with Brazil after granting a 25% price break on Efavirez (savings $10 million). However, Bristol-Myers Squibb, a fourth company announced a 76% discount on Atazanavir, producing a $60 million annual saving for Brazil. Admittedly, Brazil has a highly competent generic industry, led by the Far-Manguinhos state laboratory, which has been producing seven non-patent protected ARVs locally. This local production capacity and the credible threat of compulsory licenses have dramatically reduced Brazil’s annual costs per patient for antiretroviral therapy. However, even while Brazil evaluates its internal pharmaceutical production capacity and while Far-Manguinhos investigates the development processes of these three newer ARVs, Brazil is seeking to fill a temporary gap in its ability to source these drugs locally. India is producing the three drugs in question lawfully because its patent system currently protects processes only. Thus, it can export reverse-engineered and differently produced drugs lawfully to any country where there is no patent bar. Because the drugs themselves are not patent protected in India, this entire transaction is not subject to the new Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement. Instead, India can produce and export any quantity it desires and Brazil can override the existing patents with an ordinary compulsory license. |
3.2.2 Parallel imports
Parallel importation is importation, without the
direct consent of the patent-holder, of a product voluntarily and legally
marketed in another country by the patent-holder or by another authorized
party. The rationale for permitting parallel importing is to promote price
competition for patented products by allowing importation of patented products
marketed at a lower price in another country by or with the consent of the
patent-holder. This indirect competition with oneself was thought to increase
the likelihood of fair pricing between countries.
In TRIPS terminology, a patent-holder's right to
limit distribution of a product after its first sale has been
"exhausted" once the product has been marketed by or with the consent
of the patent-holder. Almost all
countries have a minimal principle of national exhaustion, permitting resale
within a country after a first sale; such resale is necessary to the ordinary
movement of products through the wholesale and retail distribution system. In addition to this minimal provision, some
countries have adopted an international exhaustion rule, meaning that products
can be lawfully imported from a foreign source once the patent holder or its
licensee had made a profit (exhausted its rights) via the original sale of the
product.
The TRIPS Agreement does not prohibit member
countries from adopting the principle of international exhaustion; in fact, it
explicitly permits it. That permission
starts with Article 6 which states that disputes relating to exhaustion are not
subject to the WTO dispute settlement process.
Although the U.S. and E.U. argued that Article 27.1 barred parallel
importation, despite the Article 6 rule, any doubts on this score were
eliminated by the Paragraph 5(d) of the Doha Declaration, which expressly
recognized Members’ right to elect their own exhaustion rule and thereafter to
parallel import.
Under an even more liberal
interpretation, a country that recognizes “international exhaustion” might be
permitted to import drugs produced under a compulsory license issued in another
country, even if there were no compulsory license issued in the importing
state. Pursuant to this analysis,
parallel importation would be TRIPS-compliant because rights would have been
exhausted (or permission for sale would have been granted) by the compulsory
licensee.[91] The uncertainty in using this approach,
however, is whether the product would be considered to have been “permissibly”
placed in the stream of commerce if the product were being produced pursuant to
an “involuntary” or compulsory license.
The pharmaceutical industry is highly critical of
parallel importation because it limits companies’ ability to charge whatever a
local market will bear. It also potentially
reduces profits in high-price countries, but only if consumers can lawfully
obtain cheaper sources of supply with a lower profit margin elsewhere. To allay this risk, most developed countries
have imposed significant restrictions on parallel importation of
medicines. For example, the U.S.
prohibits the practice completely except for consumer’s personal supply of
medicines purchased abroad, whereas the E.C. permits regional importation only
between members of the European Union.
In addition, pharmaceutical companies have several private options to
circumvent parallel importation rules.
The most Draconian would be to impose a uniform high price worldwide
thereby decreasing affordability in middle-income and low-income nations. Other solutions are more subtle. For example, a company could limit its
supply to a low-price country to an amount sufficient for internal consumption
only. This strategy is already being
pursued by some patent holders in Canada where U.S. consumers are beginning to
engage in a larger volume of internet sales with Canadian distributors.[92] Alternatively, especially in a price-control
jurisdiction, a company could charge two prices, one for domestic consumption
and a second for export products.[93]
Although there are many contexts where activists
would disapprove of protective anti-parallel pricing practices by multinational
pharmaceuticals, prohibitions against parallel export/import probably make the
most sense when a company has been “convinced” to make major price concessions
to a particular developing country or region, as in the Accelerating Access
Initiative. However, a more progressive
analysis would not necessarily object to parallel export/import to other
developing countries not yet reached by concessionary or discount pricing. Oxfam and others have addressed this dilemma
by proposing that there be one parallel import rule for developing countries
and another for developed countries.
Although developing countries would be free to parallel import from any
cheaper branded source, developed countries would not be permitted to parallel
import from nations receiving concessionary pricing.[94]
3.2.3
Article
31(b), (f) compulsory licenses – non-predominant quantities
If authorized by local law, Article 31 of TRIPS
permits a competent government authority, including a health or patent
department, to license the manufacture, sale, and use of an invention to an
authorized third-party or government agency without the consent of the
patent-holder. Although such licenses
could stimulate price-lowering competition and ensure availability of needed
medicines, no developing nation has yet issued a compulsory license for
HIV/AIDS medicines, though an application is pending in South Africa and
licenses have been threatened on several occasions by Brazil. Complicating any
such effort is the fact that few developing countries have comprehensive
compulsory licensing clauses in their patent legislation. Even as developing countries amend their
intellectual property regimes to become TRIPS compliant, many of them are not
taking advantage of the TRIPS-compliant compulsory license provisions that
exist.
The permissible grounds for
compulsory licenses are not fully enumerated or delimited in the TRIPS
Agreement, and thus developing nations have significant discretion in selecting
health sensitive policies. Permissible
grounds for compulsory licensing include public health and the public interest
broadly defined, see Article 8,
national emergencies and matters of extreme urgency such as epidemics, Article
31(b), public non-commercial or governmental use, id., and/or to remedy anti-competitive practices, Article 31(k)
(discussed further in the following sub-section). Some of these grounds justify expedited governmental action. For example, under Article 31(b), when the
government declares an emergency or a matter of extreme urgency, such as the
AIDS pandemic, it could seek a compulsory license for itself, or for an
authorized third party, to begin commercial exploitation without first
negotiating with the patent holder.
Similarly, when the government is seeking a license for public,
non-commercial use, the government or its authorized agent is not required to
seek prior approval and it can limit the patent-holder’s remedies to review of
the amount of compensation. Article
42. Finally, under Article 31(k), if
the government acts to redress anti-competitive practices or abuse of patent,
it can both reduce the amount of compensation to the patent holder and
distribute the product without quantity restrictions outside the domestic
market.
Although TRIPS is relatively
indifferent about the grounds for issuing a compulsory license, it is
relatively strict about the procedures that must be followed in order for an
ordinary license to be granted. Except
in cases of governmental, non-commercial use, cases arising from
anti-competitive practice, or cases involving emergency or extreme urgency, the
government is ordinarily required to seek a voluntary licensee on commercially
reasonable grounds for a reasonable period of time. Article 31(b). In
addition, as previously stated, the licensee is required to pay adequate
compensation. Article 31(h). Despite a requirement of case-specific
determinations, however, it might be appropriate to set forth factors affecting
royalty rates including public expenditures, inventiveness, research and
development costs, remaining life of the patent, purpose of use, and other
valid factors. Alternatively, countries
could specify relatively modest royalties in the range of 2-10% that have
become traditional in the pharmaceutical field.[95]
Even if a compulsory license is granted, the
patent-holder retains its underlying intellectual property rights in the
patent. The license granted is
non-exclusive, meaning the patent-holder and its other licensees can still
compete; moreover, the license is non-assignable. Article 31(d). More
significantly, the license is revocable once the circumstances that led to its
granting have ceased to exist, though some consideration must be given to the
interests of the licensee who may have invested heavily in order to manufacture
the licensed product. Article 31(c) and
(g). This possibility of revocation creates barriers to entry in developing
countries even in those rare circumstances where they have sufficient drug
manufacturing capacity to produce drugs locally.
One of
the most problematic features of the compulsory license regime is that licenses
be issued “predominantly for the supply of the domestic market,” except in
cases of patent abuse where this limit does not apply. Article 31(f), (k). The meaning of this “domestic supply”
requirement is inherently unclear as it might mean that “the predominant
portion of products produced must be consumed domestically” or
alternatively that “the license shall be predominantly for the benefit
of domestic consumption.”[96] With the latter interpretation, a country
would be justified in exporting a major portion of its production, if such
export were necessary in order to have large production runs so as to efficiently
supply the domestic market. This is the
preferable interpretation of Article 31(f) because it could result in a
regional manufacturer being able to supply several small markets in order to
achieve cost efficient economies-of-scale.
Under any interpretation, however, an importing country could utilize a
non-Paragraph 6 compulsory license to import the non-predominate portion of an
exporting country’s generic product.
3.2.4
Article
31(k) compulsory license
Fortunately, as referenced
above, there is a predominately-for-the-domestic-market exception in Article
31(k) where a patent-holder has been found to have anti-competitively abused
its patent, by excessive pricing or otherwise, in the producing country. In these circumstances, a generic producer
operating under a compulsory license could produce on a large scale for export,
most relevantly even where a non-special, non-Paragraph-6 compulsory license
had been granted in the importing country.
Since TRIPS provides no definition of what might constitute an
anti-competitive practice and since Article 1 states that Members should
“determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of [TRIPS]
within their own legal system and practice,” it seems clear that individual
countries are permitted to develop definitions of anti-competitive behavior so
long as they are not transparently TRIPS-nullifying. In this regard, Article 40 directly empowers Member states to
address anti-competitive practices in licensing agreements.
By their very nature, patents
are anti-competitive because they enable the patent holder to exclude other
manufacturers and vendors. Therefore,
although “normal” exploitation of patent rights might not constitute an
anti-competitive practice, excessive prices and refusals to license might be
held anti-competitive in particular settings, particularly where a product
dominates a therapeutic class. Another
anti-competitive practice might be the now routine practice of patent holders
discriminating in prices offered to the public and private sector and the
practice of price differentiation among countries. Since price discrimination is frowned upon in many competition
schemes, discriminatory pricing might justify the issuance of a license.
The most promising argument,
however, is one that combines excessive or abusive pricing and a relative
failure to work the patent thereby creating access gap for the product. Given that many competition schemes are
designed to prohibit excessive pricing, it is possible to argue that high
prices are unwarranted even where there are multiple providers in the
therapeutic class. This argument is
bolstered when it can be shown that excessive pricing effectively eliminates
product availability, producing a substantial failure to work the patent for
the vast majority of consumers. If
medicines are not being provided on a reasonably affordable basis, bearing some
reasonable relation to the costs of production, then a country could issue a
compulsory license under Article 31(k) on the basis of abusive pricing/non-working.
Because anti-retroviral medicines have been largely discovered and developed
with public money,[97]
because industry profits have been so high,[98]
and because the prices of anti-retroviral drugs have been grossly inflated,
there is a strong argument that patent-holders of essential antiretrovirals
have abused their market position and that an export-promoting, Article 31(k)
compulsory license could be issued.
An alternative access hap theory focuses on the issue of downstream
innovation, product improvement, or product combinations. One version of this theory is the essential
facilities doctrine utilized where a follow-on product cannot be marketed
without the approval or a license from one or more patent holder.[99] This doctrine has particular utility with respect to fixed dose
combination medicines. The fixed-dose combination, essential facilities theory is
particularly important in light of a recent recommendation of the WHO
recommending fixed-dose ARV combinations as a first line therapy in resource
poor settings.[100] Drug
companies do not make fixed-dose combinations of the most effective ARV
combinations because patents on the different medicines are held by different
companies and those companies have been unwilling thus far to cross-license medicines
with competitors.[101] This refusal has had negative public health
consequences because it increases patients’ pill burden and complicates patient
compliance with complex pill-taking schedules.
Generic companies, on the other hand, face no such constraint and gladly
produce combination medicines when patent rules do not prevent them from doing
so.
|
South African example These
arguments are no longer theoretical. On October 16, 2003, the South African Competition
Commission announced a finding upholding a complaint by the Treatment Action
Campaign and others against two pharmaceutical giants, GlaxoSmithKline South
Africa and Boehringer Ingelheim, and holding that both companies had charged
excessive prices for their patent-protected antiretroviral medicines. The ruling further held that they had
unlawfully refused to issue voluntary licenses to generic competitors and
that they had thereby unreasonably restricted access to an essential facility[102]
preventing production of fixed-dose combination medicines. Menzi
Simelane, Commission at the Competition Commission, said in the Commission’s
media release that “Our investigation revealed that each of the firms has
refused to license their patents to generic manufacturers in return for a
reasonable royalty. We believe that this is feasible and that consumers will
benefit from cheaper generic versions of the drugs concerned. We will request
the Tribunal to make an order authorising any person to exploit the patents
to market generic versions of the respondents patented medicines or fixed
dose combinations that require these patents, in return for the payment of a
reasonable royalty. In addition, we will recommend a penalty of 10% of the
annual turnover of the respondents' ARVs in South Africa for each year that
they are found to have violated the Act." In
response to the looming threat of punishing hearings before the Competition
Tribunal in South Africa, on December 10, GSK and BI both announced voluntary
licensing agreements with the complainants.
Under the terms of the settlement agreement, negotiated in the shadow
of threatened anti-competitive-practices compulsory licenses, (1) sales will be permitted in public, private,
and NGO sectors; (2) there will be an expand geographical scope permitting
manufacturers to reach efficient economies of scale so long as they produce
the medicines in South Africa; (3) the licenses are open to a reasonable
number of producers (four for GSK and three for BI); (4) the licenses permit
combination of licenses and production of fixed-dose medicines; and (5) they
are be based on modest royalties of 5% only. |
3.2.5
Legal certainty concerning post-Paragraph 6 Implementation
Agreement
sourcing
flexibilities
Some
commentators have been concerned that the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement
and Chairman’s Statement might somehow compromise or limit flexibilities for
accessing imported generics that existed under previous agreements. This is not a credible concern with respect
to the four no-patent options first described above, nor even for the Article
31(f) and Article 31(k) options.
Paragraph 9 of the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement reads as
follows:
|
This
Decision is without prejudice to the rights, obligations and flexibilities
that Members have under the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement other than
paragraphs (f) and (h) of Article 31, including those reaffirmed by the
Declaration, and to their interpretation.
It is also without prejudice to the extent to which pharmaceutical
products produced under a compulsory licence can be exported under the
present provisions of Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement. |
This
paragraph expressly acknowledges all of the no-patent options outlined
above. Likewise, it does not directly
limit rights under 31(k) nor non-predominate amounts under 31(f).
3.2.6
Limited
exceptions under Article 30
Paragraph
9 might be interpreted even more liberally to mean that the Paragraph 6
Implementation Agreement does not exclude the possibility of Article 30
production in an exporting country.
Although there is no direct sanction for an Article 30 approach, the
“Decision is without prejudice to the rights, obligations and flexibilities
that Members have under the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement other than
paragraphs (f) and (h) of Article 31,” and Article 30 is still one of those
flexibilities.
The text of Article 30 of the
TRIPS Agreement certainly evidences enough flexibility to justify limited
exceptions designed to address the public health needs of the developing world,
including those arising for poor countries that are not able to make effective
use of compulsory licenses because they lack meaningful capacity to manufacture
medicines locally.
Members may provide limited
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such
exceptions do not unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the patent owner, taking
into account the legitimate interest of third parties. (Emphases added.)
As a guiding interpretive principle, it is important
to recognize that Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement authorizes member countries
to consider public health and public interests needs when drafting their patent
laws “provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement.” Similarly, Article 7
provides that intellectual property rights “should contribute to the promotion
of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology,
to the mutual advantage of producers and users . . . in a manner conducive to
social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.” For these two provisions to mean anything,
they should mean that member states can balance public health, public interest,
and consumer needs in some affirmative way that impacts the unfettered exercise
of patent rights. Thus, given the
extent of the public health problems in developing countries and given the
realities that many developing countries cannot produce medicines locally, it
makes sense under public health, trade, and human rights principles to fashion
limited exceptions that permit the export→import of generic medicines to
those poor nations.
The language of Article 30 supports an
interpretation that some significant
impact on patent rights is permissible.
For example, the first requirement of Article 30 is that the exception
must be limited. Although “limited”
does not mean that total abrogation of patents would be permitted, it must mean
that some impact is possible, such as the quite significant impact of the
“Bolar” exception,[103]
which can accelerate approval of generic competition by as much as three years
costing the patent holder millions, even billions, of dollars. Similarly, the second and third clauses of
Article 30 permit some conflict with the normal exploitation of a patent,
though not an “unreasonable conflict,” and some prejudice to the legitimate
interests of the patent owner, though not “unreasonable prejudice.” Lawyers are used to talking about the
meaning of what is “unreasonable,” but once again the language necessarily
suggests that some conflict and some prejudice is permissible – so long as the
limited exception does not go too far.
When producing for export only under an Article 30
limited exception, there is no real curtailment of the patent holder’s rights
in the consuming country. If that
country had manufacturing capacity, it could produce medicines own its
own. Since it does not, a limited
exception simply gives no-capacity countries a legal source of off-site
manufacture, leveling their playing field vis-à-vis countries with productive
capacity. If the medicine were
on-patent in the importing country, the importer would pay a previously
determined royalty fee. Alternatively,
if the medicine were off-patent in the importing country, then its consumers
would not be unreasonably burdened by a royalty imposed in the exporting
country.
Fortunately, the language of Article 30 does not
suggest that only the patent holder’s rights be considered; instead, it
requires that the exception be judged “taking account of the legitimate
interests of third parties” including presumably millions of poor people living
with HIV/AIDS and other treatable diseases.
There is no geographical scope given about “third parties” who count,
and thus the legitimate interests of third parties living in developing
countries weigh heavily. This last
proviso strongly suggests that Article 30 incorporates a principle of
proportionality such that if the public health interests of third parties are
substantial, then a more significant limitation on patent rights is
permissible. In the real world, if
these “third parties” in developing countries do not get the lowest-price,
assured-quality generics available, they will
die.
3.2.7 The Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement
The
real difficulties of the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement and Chairman’s
Statement concern post-1995 discoveries and arise much more broadly in 2005
when no one but non-WTO members, least developed countries, and/or companies in
WTO member countries that have issued compulsory licenses will be able to
manufacture and export a patented medicine.
It is at this time that countries like India will have to become fully
TRIPS compliant and will have to provide patent protection for post-1995
pipeline/mailbox patent applications and for all post 2005 discoveries if a
patent has been filed and granted.
The
Implementation Agreement also applies to countries where a medicine is
currently on patent and where it seeks to export more than 49% of the product
under a non-competition-remedy compulsory license. Thus, for example, were Nigeria to seek becoming a regional
producer and exporter in Southern Africa, it would need to issue Implementation
Agreement-compliant compulsory licenses.
On the more immediate horizon, Canada would need to do so also if it
succeeds in amending its patent legislation as promised.
The Canadian Example – Pending Legislation
On Thursday, November 6, 2003, the Canadian government
introduced a bill that would amend its Patent Act to provide for the issuance
of compulsory licenses that would allow Canadian generic manufactures to make
and export generic versions of patented pharmaceutical products to developing
countries lacking their own manufacturing capacity. Canadian NGOs and the UN Special Envoy on HIV/AIDS in Africa,
Stephen Lewis, had urged the government to take this initiative following the
August 30 Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement. Canadian civil society organizations are reportedly pleased that
the proposed bill did not authorize compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals
only to treat specific diseases or to address only "emergencies" or other circumstances of extreme urgency
as initially reported. However civil
society organizations identified some serious flaws in the bill as introduced.[104]
(1) Provisions
permitting patent-holders a right of first refusal to block export licenses. The bill includes provisions that give the
company holding the Canadian patent on a pharmaceutical product the right of
first refusal to take over contracts negotiated by generic pharmaceutical
manufacturers with developing country governments or other authorized
importers. In order to do so, the
patent-holding company would have 30 days to meet the terms of the contract
negotiated between the Canadian generic producer and the developing country
purchaser. Under the Bill as drafted,
if the patent-holder takes over the contract the patent holder would be relieved
from any obligation to negotiate the terms of a voluntary license for the
generic manufacturer to make and export the product and the Commissioner of
Patents would be prohibited from issuing a compulsory license to the generic
company. Under such a legislative
scheme, generic manufacturers might quickly lose incentive to negotiate export
contracts in the first place. Instead
the patent-holder would be able to repeatedly block the generic manufacturer
from obtaining the export license needed to make the product and fulfill the
contract.
(2) Limited list of
pharmaceutical products. The bill lists pharmaceutical products for which a
compulsory license may be obtained, limited to patented medicines on the WHO
Model List of Essential Medicines. The
bill also contemplates that the Canadian Cabinet could authorize the addition
(or removal) of any other "patented product that may be used to address
public health problems." Given the
protracted battle over disease limitations post-Doha, a limited list of
products represents a step backward and is certainly not required by the
Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement.
(3) Denial of benefit to
developing countries that are not WTO members. Under the proposed bill, all countries recognized as
"least-developed countries" could benefit from the export of generic
pharmaceutical products as could developing country WTO members. However, developing countries that do not
belong to the WTO are unable to benefit from the possibility of importing
generic pharmaceuticals from Canada.
There is no sound basis for excluding such countries from potentially
under this legislation.
4. LEGISLATIVE REFORM IN IMPORTING AND
EXPORTING COUNTRIES
In
order for any exportation of on-patent medicines to be lawful, whether pursuant
to exhaustion rules, an Article 31(f) or 31(k) compulsory license, or an
Article 30 limited exception, there must be enabling legislation in the
exporting country permitting such exportation.
Likewise, there must also be provisions for issuance of import
compulsory licenses in importing nations where medicines are under patent. Accordingly, in order to maximize their
future flexibilities, most countries should enact legislation with respect
being both an importer and an exporter of generic medicines.
A
previous review of developed country patent laws reveals that few of them have
incorporated pro-public health flexibilities into their patent schemes. For example, only thirteen countries have
adopted legislation permitting issuance of voluntary licenses to address public
health emergencies, only eleven to remedy anti-competitive practices, and only
four for failure to license.[105] Moreover, another constellation of
developing and least developed countries has prematurely adopted TRIPS
compliant legislation and in some cases TRIPS-plus legislation. Thus, in order to secure the hard fought
gains in the Doha Declaration and the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement,
developing countries must quickly operationalize all the flexibilities they
have achieved by amending national legislation as outlined in Chart Two below.
Chart Two Legislative Reform
Legislative Reform in Importing Country |
Legislative Reform in Exporting Country |
|
1. Authority
to grant compulsory licenses on all permissible grounds: a. For
emergencies and other matters of extreme urgency without prior notification
(TRIPS Art. 31(b)); would be wise to designate HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria as
public health matters of extreme urgency not subject to emergency declaration
standards, constitutional or legislative (Doha Declaration ¶ 5(c)); b. For
governmental non-commercial use without prior notification (TRIPS Art. 31(b); c.
On other public health grounds for any
diseases and medical conditions requiring access to more affordable
pharmaceutical products (TRIPS Art. 31(b), Doha Declaration ¶ 5(b)) d. To
remedy anti-competitive practices and therefore to be able to export to other
countries (TRIPS Art. 31(k), Art. 40):
i.
Abusive or excessive pricing leading to
a gap in access (S.A. Comp. Comm.);
ii.
Refusal to issue voluntary licenses
(S.A. Comp. Comm.);
iii.
Essential technology or essential
facilities doctrine especially important with respect to sourcing fixed-dose
combination medicines (S.A. Comp Comm.)
iv.
Any and all other anti-competitive
practices; e.
Stipulation that all such licenses can
be satisfied by local production and/or import (TRIPS Art. 27.1) f.
Special compulsory licenses for import
when country determines it lacks capacity to manufacture efficiently or
timely domestically (Para. 6 Implementation Agreement); g. Ability
to register generics via comparison to confidential data (TRIPS Art. 39.3). 2. International
exhaustion regime allowing parallel importation (TRIPS Art. 6, Doha
Declaration ¶ 5(d)). 3. Ability
to export regionally if part of a regional trade agreement (Paragraph 6
Implementation Agreement ¶ 6(i)). |
1. Authority
to grant regular compulsory license on all permissible grounds (emergencies,
governmental/non-commercial use, public health, and to remedy
anti-competitive practices) (TRIPS Art. 31(b), 31(k), Doha Declaration ¶ 5(b) and (c); 2. Authority
to export non-predominate quantities pursuant to a regular compulsory license
(TRIPS Art. 31(f) and authority to export unlimited quantities in the event
of practices found anti-competitive (TRIPS Art. 31(k), see 1.d grounds for
issuing licenses for anti-competitive practices). 3. Authority
to grant compulsory licenses on the basis of notification of a member
developing country to the TRIPS Council pursuant to the Paragraph 6
Implementation Agreement; a. Should
allow simplified procedures; b. Should
allow joint consideration of concurrent licenses on multiple drugs and for
multiple importers; c.
Must require notification, procedures
and limitations of the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement and perhaps the
Chairperson’s Statement) 4. Authority
to produce medicines for export based on a Paragraph 6 request as a limited
exception (TRIPS Art. 30 – untested); 5. Authority
to produce medicines for export on humanitarian grounds as a limited
exception (TRIPS Art. 30 – untested); 6. Authority
for wholesalers and other buyers to export patented medicines already sold by
patent holders to other developing countries to satisfy their parallel
importation needs (TRIPS Art. 6); a. Consider
making it an anti-competitive practice for a patent holder to restrict quantities
or to place contract limits on right to “parallel export;” 7. Require
least costly methods of differentiation required to satisfy the Paragraph 6
Implementation Agreement’s provisions concerning danger of product diversion. 8. Encourage
technology transfer to developing countries without capacity to manufacture
medicines. |
It is beyond the scope of this paper to suggest actual language
for amendment of domestic legislation.
However, developing countries should be leery of technical assistance on
these questions from traditional sources.
Despite refraining from comprehensively addressing all the permutations
of legislative reform, this paper will directly address two areas of special
concern: competition policy and
competition-related regulation of voluntary licenses.
4.1 Competition policy reform
One of the principle innovations in the list above is that
developing countries pay close attention to their competition policy as well as
their patent law. As the South African
Competition Commission case demonstrates, aggressive competition policy can be
a formidable weapon in countries’ efforts to obtain access to generics and to
achieve economies-of-scale by inclusion of non-domestic markets. Because of the path-breaking nature of South
Africa’s emerging competition law, this subsection will analyze the application
of that law in some depth so that other developing country members might
consider the wisdom of adopting similar or improved measures.
Section 56 of the South African Patents Act 57 of 1978,
as amended by the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 38 of 1997, covers
four specific circumstances whereby "(1) any interested person who can
show that the rights in a patent are being abused may apply to the commissioner
in the prescribed manner for a compulsory license under the patent."[106] The legal definitions of abuse of patent are
quite specific:
1.
Non-working on a commercial
scale or to an adequate extent (within a 3 or 4 year period of filing the
patent application or certification of the patent) and there is no satisfactory
reason for such non-working (sub-sec. (2)(a)). The requirement of working to "an adequate extent" is
somewhat imprecise, but does appear to cover supply limits which are deficient
in terms of market demand.
2.
Demand for the product is
not being met to an adequate extent and on reasonable terms (sub-sec.
(2)(c)). The statute appears to require the demand to
be an actual not merely anticipatory.
In South Africa, there is no doubt that the true demand for AIDS
medicines is not being met primarily as a result of high prices for
medicines. Thus, the question becomes
whether the "reasonable terms" provision includes price. Fortunately,
there appears to be little doubt that the phrase "reasonable terms"
refers primarily to the price charged. James Lomax Cathro's Applications (1934)
51 RPC 75 @ 82. Even though drug
companies have dramatically lowered prices, frequently by as much as 85%,
current conditional discount prices by pharmaceutical patent holders are still
three or four times as expensive as the much cheaper generics offered by Cipla,
Rambaxy, and Hetero of India. Moreover,
the price differentials are much sharper in the private sector where the drug
companies continue to seek higher profits (private sector ARVs still cost over
$2000/year in South Africa). Thus,
because of unreasonable pricing in the private sector and comparatively
unreasonable pricing terms even in the public and NGO sectors, a strong case
could be made for the issuance of a compulsory license under this subsection.
3.
Refusal to grant a license
on reasonable terms that prejudices an existing or emerging trade or industry
and it is in the public interest to grant a license (sub-sec. (2)(d)). This provision appears to be inapplicable to current
access issues.[107] If the provision were to be adopted to
include an essential facilities doctrine, like that contained in the
competition scheme described below, this provision would be much more helpful. In general it would be highly desirable for
a patent scheme to include a refusal to deal provision.[108]
4.
Demand is being met by
importation and the price is excessive in relation to the price charged in
the countries where the patented article is manufactured (sub-sec.
(2)(e)). Since most pharmaceutical
manufacturing is done in the U.S. and in rich European countries where prices
are high, there is no "unfavorable price discrimination” in South Africa
on most drug prices compared to First World prices. However, some patented medicines are more expensive in some developing
countries than in the country of origin.
In these limited circumstances, South Africa could issue a compulsory
license. (A more direct route with
respect to differential pricing across countries, however, is parallel
importation under the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act No.101 of
1965, as amended).
In addition to the Patent Act, the South African
Competition Act 89 of 1998 provides remedies for anti-competitive practices and
presumably permits the issuance of a compulsory license for anti-competitive
pricing practices by the pharmaceutical industry. Section 8 of the South African Competition Act prohibits dominant
firms from engaging in excessive pricing, refusing access to an essential facility
and engaging in other exclusionary acts:
8. Abuse of dominance prohibited. It is prohibited for a dominant firm[109]
to -
(a) charge an
excessive price to the detriment of consumers;
(b) refuse to give a
competitor access to an essential facility when it is economically feasible to
do so;
(c) engage in an
exclusionary act, other than an act listed in paragraph (d),[110]
if the anti-competitive effect of that act outweighs its technological,
efficiency or other pro-competitive gain; …
Section
1 provides key definitions:[111]
(viii) ‘essential facility’ means an infrastructure
or resource that cannot reasonably be duplicated, and without access to which
competitors cannot reasonably provide goods or services to their customers;
(ix) ‘excessive
price’ means a price for a good or service which –
(aa) bears no
reasonable relation to the economic value of that good or service; and
(bb) is higher than
the value referred to in subparagraph (aa);
(x) ‘exclusionary
act’ means an act that impedes or prevents a firm entering into, or expanding
within, a market;
(xii) ‘goods or
services’, when used with respect to particular goods or services, includes any
other goods or services that are reasonably capable of being substituted for
them, taking into account ordinary commercial practice and geographical,
technical and temporal constraints;
In
its recently announced decision, the South African Competition Commission
supported three theories for issuing a pharmaceutical compulsory license. Under the first theory, compulsory licenses
should be granted whenever it can be shown that there is a gap between need for
the medicine and its accessibility due to excessive pricing, in other words,
whenever an “above market value” price contributes to the access gap. The second theory involves the failure to
grant voluntary licenses which can be considered exclusionary where the
anti-competitive effect of non-licensing outweighs any “technological,
efficiency or other pro-competitive gain.” Under the third
access-to-an-essential-facility theory, a compulsory license should be issued
whenever a patent holder’s failure to grant voluntary licenses denies consumer
access to a competitor’s product. This
theory has particular salience with respect to downstream innovation, such as
fixed-dose combination drugs. Just as dominant firms are
prohibited from charging excess prices that limit access, they are prohibited
from engaging in exclusionary acts such as refusing to supply scarce goods to a
competitor when supplying them is economically feasible. This essential facilities/refusal to deal
rule applies most strongly where a generic company is seeking a license to make
a fixed-dose combination of medicines patented by several different
companies.
Although a price discrimination theory was not
directly adopted by the Competition Commission, a dominant firm may be found
guilty of prohibited price discrimination if the firm discriminates between
purchasers in the price charged. §§ 9(1)(b) & 9
(c)(ii). At present, pharmaceutical
companies discriminate significantly between the public and private sectors in
for antiretrovirals and other drugs.
Although some differences might be accounted for because of bulk
purchase, clearly these discounts are not related solely to cost. On the other hand, it is highly desirable
that the public sector obtains deep price discounts and it would be an
unconscionable outcome if companies reacted to the price discrimination issue
by revoking public sector discounts.
Since the long-term public health mandate is for cheap medicines in both
the public and private sector, it seems desirable to seek compulsory licenses
on the basis of price discrimination while carefully balancing the risk of a
backlash from the pharmaceutical companies.
4.2 Regulating voluntary licenses
Voluntary
licensing agreements result from negotiations between patent holders and other
entities. Ordinarily voluntary licensing agreements allow third parties to use
a patent holder’s patent to produce, market, or otherwise distribute the
patented product normally in exchange for an unregulated royalty or licensing
fee to the patent holder. In addition
to requiring agreed-upon compensation for licensing, the patent holder can
ordinarily impose restrictions on the sale or transfer of the license and on
the geographical distribution and marketing of the affected product.[112] Finally, the patent holder can limit the
duration of agreement and can even make it terminable at will or revocable on
certain conditions. When voluntary
licenses are unregulated, pharmaceutical companies can enforce terms on the
amount of compensation, permitted usages, and distribution, especially
export.
To counterbalance the risk of anti-competitive
outcomes in voluntary licenses mandated by compulsory licensing schemes,
developing countries could choose to regulate the following
pro-competitive/commercially reasonable terms of voluntary licenses: (a) expansion of geographical scope and
explicit options for export within a Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement
authorized regional trade group, (b) prohibition of sector limitations (no
public sector or NGO-only sector clauses), (c) non-exclusivity, (d) direct
permission to produce fixed-dose combination medicines, (d) requirements of
some degree of technology transfer and/or manufacturing know-how, (e) access to
confidential test data for purposes of establishing bio-equivalence and equal
bio-availability, and (f) public disclosure of royalty rates negotiated within
a range of reasonableness. This kind of
regulation of voluntary licenses to prevent anti-competitive practices is
directly authorized by Article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement.[113]
1.
Geographical restrictions. For voluntary licenses to be of any real use
in increasing access to high quality, affordable medicines, the licensee has to
be able to achieve economies-of-scale sufficient to justify investment in human
and physical capacity. For a few
countries and for a few drugs, the internal market may be sufficiently large
and/or rich to justify investment by the licensee and to achieve meaningful
economies-of-scale. However, for many
smaller economies and/or economies with severely limited purchasing power,
efficient economies-of-scale can only be achieved by means of regional
markets. As a general proposition,
therefore, voluntary licenses should not be unduly burdened with unrealistic
geographical restrictions. In this
context, permitting licenses for distribution throughout Africa would certainly
make some sense, both to countries with and without patents in place. Likewise, an even broader distribution to
all "developing" countries might also make sense.[114]
Another reason to have few geographical
restrictions with respect to voluntary licenses is the issue of
non-exclusivity. Ordinarily, it will
not be desirable to give a voluntary license to one producer only. Of course, there is a complex balancing act
to figure out how many licenses can exist within a given national or regional
market before the number of licenses begins to create disincentives to
entrepreneurial investment in capacity.
On the other hand, recent research indicates that prices go down
dramatically, in the absence of price controls, only when a certain number of
generic competitors enter the market.
Rather than reproduce a small number of generic monopolists, each with
its own individual market concentration, it would be better, as a matter of
policy, to open up the geographical scope of a license to permit competition
between licensees, each of whom could achieve economies-of-scale but still be
subject to stiff competition in any given market. An alternative route to affordability would be voluntary price
control terms in the license itself.
However, these price-ceiling agreements might raise some competition concerns
in some countries though price maintenance/fixing concerns are usually a
problem with respect to price floor, not price ceilings.
Despite urging few geographical
restrictions with respect to developing country markets, it might be
appropriate to permit patent holders to impose geographical restrictions with
respect to developed country markets.
In this regard, and into the foreseeable future, the industry is going
to be able to affect national legislation in developed economies to prohibit
parallel importation from developing countries where the industry has offered
discount prices or where it has issued voluntary licenses. However, with a geographical limitation,
there will be a contractually enforceable patent bar in developed countries as
well. In this regard, the industry
might well be concerned about allowing contractual sanctions for improper
diversion of licensed drugs to developed economies. However, as long as national exhaustion (U.S.) and regional
exhaustion (E.U.) are the only options within developed countries, the prospects
of product diversion and gray markets is greatly reduced. Even so, a given company could impose some
reasonable sanction on intentional breaches of geographical limitations by a
license holder. These sanctions could
range all the way from multiple royalties to eventual termination of the license
for repeated bad faith breaches.
2. Market segmentation. Market segmentation, e.g., public vs.
private, is problematic especially in developing countries. At present, major pharmaceutical companies
have made a decision to seek profits off the small elite populations within
developing markets, even at the cost of unaffordability for the vast majority
of people infected with diseases such as AIDS.
However, a generic licensee is going to want some access to private
sector buyers with money to spend, rather than bet solely on uncertain public
expenditures by poor countries or evaporating donor support for the Global
Fund. It may be galling to proprietary
companies that even small rich "profit centers" will be lost, but if
they really want to contribute to the global treatment, they will have to bite
the bullet and give up on public/private sector differentiation.
One problem with trying to maintain a
private sector/public sector market differentiation is that it will become
virtually impossible to secure distribution channels so as to prevent theft,
corruption, and diversion to the more lucrative private market, undercutting
the marketing advantage there anyway.
Similarly, even in the private sector, most Africa developing country
consumers cannot afford moderately discounted ARVs. Thus, if there are large price differentials between medicines in
the private and public sector, an additional effect of high prices in the
private sector might be disruptive migration of more affluent HIV-positive
consumers to the already overburdened public sector. Accordingly, if developing countries want to get the maximum
treatment to the most people at the lowest cost and if they want to avoid
disruption of the public sector by migration from the private sector, drug
companies will have to give up their goal of market segmentation.
Despite arguing for basic price parity
between the public and private sector, it might be possible to have some slight
differences in royalty payments due based on defensible market segments, e.g.,
5% vs. 10% royalties. The problem would
be to avoid pricing differentials that would prompt the disruptions described
above.
3.
Non-exclusivity. The general principle for compulsory
licenses should be non-exclusivity, meaning that multiple licenses should be
issued. To the extent that regulation
of voluntary licenses is motivated by a desire to enhance competition,
regulators would want to disrupt the more normal practice of simply
transferring the monopoly. Therefore,
there are arguments that the best practice might be the issuance of open
licenses. However, too many entrants
can also deter investment and entry by a particular licensee. Canada is the country that has had the
greatest experience in issuing compulsory licenses for pharmaceutical products
and it granted an average of three licenses per drug, with a variance of one to
eleven.[115] The WHO, in its procurement practices tries
to ensure the presence of at least five competitors. Especially if licenses have no geographical limits and no market
restrictions, more competitors can be licensed.
4.
Cross-licensing for fixed-dose
combinations. Clearly the licenses
should permit freedom to research and cross-license fixed-dose combination
medicines and other therapeutic advances.
One of the greatest irrationalities in the current patent regime is that
it creates disincentives for patent holders to develop rational drug
combination therapies with their competitors.
In the long run, this will become one of the main rationales for the issuance
of compulsory licenses. Therefore, in
the interest of promoting public health and of maximizing treatment compliance,
the license should certainly permit, indeed promote, cross-licensing and
combination of products.
5.
Manufacturing know-how and
technology transfer. To make
voluntary licenses work and to avoid risks of poor quality drugs, the companies
should be required to assist in technology transfer. AIDS medicines in particular are complicated medicines needing
special care in quality control to ensure bio-availability in a narrow
range. Accordingly, licensees should
not have to reinvent the wheel; they should get the very best assistance
possible for transfer of technology and expertise. In this regard, voluntary licensors should specifically be
required to transfer manufacturing know-how as well as essential
technologies. In the event of trade
secrets, the drug company can require confidentiality.
6. Registration data. The voluntary license should include access
to and/or comparison against otherwise confidential data submitted to a drug
registration authority to secure market approval. The voluntary licensee should not have to conduct independent
clinical studies, but instead should be expressly permitted to establish
bio-equivalence and equal bio-availability.
In the special case of fixed-dose combinations, where a combined product
registration dossier has not previously been filed, patent holders should have
even greater obligations to permit access to underlying data so that fixed-dose
combination registration can be eased.
7.
Duration. The time line on voluntary licenses should
be long, with a presumption of renewability except for cause, so that generic
manufacturers can estimate their market and invest in productive capacity. Many newer medicines are hard to
produce. High quality pharmaceutical
capacity is expensive and time-consuming to build. Thus, the time horizon must be long enough to secure investment
under conditions of uncertainty.
8.
Royalty rates. The regulation of voluntary licenses should
include some attempt to limit royalty rates.
Relatively
small royalties in the range of 2-10% have become traditional in the
pharmaceutical field. Setting rates in this general range could be done by means of
legislative findings about a presumptive permissible range. This range could be further calibrated by
reference to the list of factors that might sensibly affect royalties including
public expenditures, inventiveness, research and development costs,
remaining life of the patent, and purpose of use.
5. POSSIBLE
RAMIFICATIONS OF GLOBAL FUND AND U.S. PROCUREMENT RULES
Because of fiscal constraints, many developing countries
will rely on donor funding for purchasing important on-patent medicines,
including antiretrovirals and combination anti-malaria medicines containing
Artemisinin. These funding sources will
in turn often prescribe procurement policies for grant recipients. Some of these requirements may impact
sourcing decisions, including the decision whether to import medicines from
abroad or to produce them domestically.
Generally these procurement policies address questions of price,
quality, and intellectual property legality.
5.1 Global Fund policies
|
C. PROCUREMENT
AND PRICING 7. Procurement practices The Fund will
require that, as a minimum, Recipient procurement offices and any contracted
agencies/services adhere to the Interagency Operational Principles for Good
Pharmaceutical Procurement.[116] Where practices differ from the
Interagency Guidelines, Recipients or their agents must demonstrate to the
LFA comparable systems for competitive bidding within a group of
pre-qualified suppliers, transparency and accountability to their practices,
and their application of necessary quality assurance mechanisms. Recipients should also demonstrate the
existence of a full set of contractual documentation to govern each
transaction. 8. Procurement responsibilities a)
The Recipient is responsible for all
procurement, with the use of contracted local, regional or international
procurement agents being at the discretion of the Recipient. The exception to this would be for those
product categories for which local procurement capacity is insufficient, as
judged by the Procurement and Supply Management Assessment. For such product categories, Recipients
would be required to use established regional or international procurement
services and will be informed by the Fund on which mechanisms are
available. b) Even
for product categories for which Recipients have procurement capacity, the
use of capable regional and global procurement services is encouraged
wherever pooling of demand lowers prices for products of assured
quality. 9. Monitoring supplier performance Recipients are
responsible for monitoring the performance of suppliers with respect to
product and service quality and for submitting that information
electronically for web publication through a mechanism established by or
identified by the Fund. Reporting
guidelines for supplier performance should be specified by the LFA, according
to guidelines provided by the Secretariat of the Fund. 10. Lowest possible price a) The
Fund requests Recipients to use Good Procurement Practices, which includes
competitive purchasing from qualified manufacturers and suppliers, as
outlined in section B of these recommendations, to attain the lowest price of
products. The Fund encourages Recipients to comply with national laws and
applicable international obligations in the field of intellectual property
including the flexibilities provided in the TRIPS agreement and referred to
in the Doha declaration in a manner that achieves the lowest possible price
for products of assured quality. b) The
Fund encourages the voluntary efforts of pharmaceutical companies to expand
current tiered or preferential pricing arrangements, among other mechanisms,
to promote differential pricing. c) Disclosure
of information on prices paid for purchases by Fund Recipients is a matter of
principle and will facilitate a process leading to lower prices. The Fund will ensure that information on
prices paid on products of assured quality with the same conditions (e.g.,
including other goods or services included in the contract) is made publicly
available. The disclosure of this
information will be pursued by the Fund.
A methodology for assuring this transparency will be presented to the
Board by January 2003. d) In
the cases of this policy, price refers to DDU costs – delivered duty
unpaid. The approach taken may be to
publicly list average, minimum,
maximum, and mode prices and/or prices for individual companies and/or
Recipients. This choice requires further consideration by the Fund to
identify or develop standard methods to ensure to the extent possible that
price information is based on a consistent set of definitions. It is understood that price comparisons
are indicative and must include special “add ons”/conditions included in the
price and that actual prices will vary. E. BUDGETING AND FINANCE 17. Direct payment to suppliers upon
delivery Prompt payment in
compliance with the terms of payment of the contractual provisions encourages
timely delivery of products and reduces transaction costs. Direct payment to suppliers by the
Trustee, on confirmation of delivery, will be allowable upon request of the
Secretariat if, as confirmed by the LFA, such payment arrangements are
expected to reduce costs and to be consistent with necessary accounting
requirements. 18. Exemption from duties, tariffs and
taxes a) The
Fund strongly encourages the relevant national authorities in the Primary
Recipient’s country to exempt from duties and taxes all public health
products financed by the Fund to NGOs, groups of NGOs, or national
authorities, or any other PRs. b) In
any case, Fund resources may not be used to pay duties, tariffs, local or
national taxes on public health products procured with Fund resources. If payment of such fees is required by
relevant national authorities, such payment is the responsibility of the
Recipient. 19. Additionality of Fund resources and
contribution to sustainability a)
The Fund encourages Recipients to
manage and to apply Fund resources as part of a sustainable long-term plan
for local public health financing.
Recipients will be required to declare in the original proposal to the
Fund other international financing and product donation programs being
utilized by Recipients. Ongoing
indicators must show the magnitude of product financing supported by domestic
versus international financing. b) Programs
which include consumer cost recovery mechanisms are eligible for funding by
the Fund when such programs are part of a pre-existing healthcare financing
policy, which should be specified in the proposal to the Fund; in these
cases, the budget request to the Fund must not duplicate costs to be
reimbursed by consumers. 21. Prices used for budgeting proposals a) For
budget requests for pharmaceutical products, proposals to the Fund must use
the lessor of current procurement prices, firm offers from suppliers, or
existing public price information sources specified by the Secretariat in the
Guidelines for Proposals. A rationale
for budgeting using prices other than those specified above should be
described in the proposal. All prices
should be expressed in standard trade terminology to allow transparent
comparison. b) During
implementation, these budgeted prices will not act as a defined reimbursable
ceiling or floor to the full cost of products paid by the Recipient, provided
that products are of assured quality and that procurement practices adhere to
the policies of the Recipient and Fund. (GF/B4/2) |
The Global Fund has adopted a lowest cost, pricing
requirement.[117] In general, this means that grant recipients
will be obligated to procure the lowest cost medicine that meets other
standards concerning quality and legality.[118] The Board of the Global Fund considered the
possibility of permitting a premium for domestically produced products.[119] This preference would have been consistent
with the policy of the World Bank, which provides for a 10-15% domestic
preference margin to local manufacturers on government tenders.[120] However, the Board rejected adopting a
domestic preference mark-up even where the government is the purchasing entity.[121] Accordingly, whenever patented
antiretrovirals or other drugs can be lawfully sourced more cheaply from
international producers, the recipient will be required to utilize that source
of supply. As an example of the
stringency of this requirement, the Global Fund requires that “all procurement
of medications for Multi-Drug Resistant TB (tuberculosis) must be conducted
through the Green Light Committee.”[122] The Green Light Committee also serves an
important function as the means by which the correct treatment of MDR-TB is
assured as much as is possible through the dissemination of information and the
review of existing TB treatment programs. The treatment of MDR-TB can be
extremely complex. One of the concerns is that without a strong, existing DOTS
program to oversee administration of the DOTS-Plus protocols, there is a risk
of creating even stronger strains of MDR-TB, resistant to even the second and
third line treatments.
B. QUALITY ASSURANCE
4. Compliance with quality standards
a) For
any medicinal product to be eligible for purchase with Fund resources, its
compliance with quality standards must be assured. For multi-source, off-patent products with available dosage from
public pharmacopoeial quality standards, verification of product compliance
with standards would be conducted in accordance with the existing national
procedures of the Recipient’s country.
b) Provided
products are accepted by the national drug regulatory agency (NDRA) of the
Recipient country (see 5 below), to be eligible for purchase with Fund
resources any single or limited source product (that is, a medicinal product
for which there are not publicly available quality assurance standards,
analytic methods, and reference standards) must (a) have been found to be
acceptable by the WHO-initiated UN Pilot Procurement Quality and Sourcing
Project, or (b) have been authorized for consumption in its country by a
stringent regulatory authority,[123]
or (c) have been authorized by the national drug regulatory authority in the
Recipient’s country. Option (c) is
applicable only until December 31, 2004, after which suppliers must comply with
one of the two standards as set out in (a) and (b) – and in all cases are
subject to monitoring product quality standards prescribed by the Fund as in
6.1.
5. National
drug registration
a) Products
procured with Fund resources are subject to authorization by the National Drug
Regulatory Authority (NDRA) in the country in which they will be used,
following its standard practices for drug registration for pharmaceutical
products. For products that have passed
the UN Pilot Procurement Quality and Sourcing Project review, as described in
above, NDRAs are encouraged to expedite registration by accepting WHO
pre-qualification inspection and supporting dossiers in lieu of national
requirements.
b) For
products which have been authorized by stringent drug regulatory authorities,
NDRAs are encouraged to expedite registration by accepting in lieu of national
requirements the Executive Summary of the Common Technical Document (CTD) or
Summary parts for quality, safety and efficacy together with all necessary
information to perform quality control testing of products and necessary
reference standards.
6. Monitoring product quality
a) Recipients,
their procurement agents, or NDRA’s must systematically draw random samples of
pharmaceutical products purchased with Fund resources for quality control
testing to monitor compliance with quality standards. Testing may be budgeted in proposals, to be funded by the
Fund. For multi-source off-patent
products with available public standards, samples should be sent to
WHO-recognized laboratories in cases where the NDRA have no capacity for this
testing.
b) For
single- or limited-source products without public standards and pre-qualified
by UN Pilot Procurement Quality and Sourcing Project, samples should be sent to
WHO-recognized laboratories already participating in the WHO pre-qualification
project in case the NDRA has no capacity.
For single- or limited-source products that have been pre-qualified on
the basis of authorization by a regulatory authority in an ICH and/or PIC/S
member, testing shall be done by a laboratory identified by the purchaser as
stated in the purchase contract. The
laboratory should be a WHO-recognized laboratory, or a laboratory in ICH and/or
PIC/S countries in case the country does not have identified laboratory
capacity.
(GF/B4/2)
Decision 4:
(Sixth Board Meeting)[124]
National Drug
Regulatory Authorities (NDRA) laboratories or laboratories recognized by the
NDRA should be used for quality monitoring by the PR (principal
recipient). To ensure the respective
laboratories have adequate capacity for full pharmacopoeial testing, they must
meet one of the following criteria:
acceptance for collaboration with WHO pre-qualification project;
accredited in accordance with ISO17025 and/or EN45002; accepted by a stringent
authority.
Because poor quality medicines can have serious health and
financial consequence, the Global Fund has adopted exacting quality standards
during both the production and distribution process. If medicines do not contain the correct active ingredients in correct
quantities, if quality and efficacy deteriorate because of improper handling or
expiration, or if medicines contain harmful substances, patients will be
exposed to substandard or even dangerous therapies that can lead to treatment
failure, drug resistance, and even death.
Accordingly, the Global Fund requires that pharmaceutical products
procured with Fund resources be authorized by the relevant national drug
regulatory authority (NDRA) in the country in which they will be used and that
agency is instructed to follow its standard practices for drug registration of
pharmaceutical products.
However, the Global Fund is not content to rely on
unreliable national safety certifications; thus it will require a separate
quality assurance guarantee starting in 2005.
At that time, pharmaceuticals will have to be pre-approved by the U.N.
Pilot Procurement Quality and Sourcing Project[125]
[WHO pre-qualification project] or be accepted for use in a country with a
stringent NDRA. This is a far-reaching
requirement that will dramatically affect countries’ decisions to support local
production. Unless they can buy, AIDS,
TB, and malaria medicines on their own, they will be required to have their
domestic supplier go through the WHO pre-qualification process, a rigorous
process that has already proved onerous and time-consuming for some experienced
Indian producers. This process is
particularly fraught with respect to fixed-dose combination ARVs where there is
no pre-existing registration portfolio.
On the other hand, the Global Fund is also interested in
speeding up the in-country registration of medicines that have been
pre-qualified by the WHO or by a stringent registration authority. As an aid to fast-track approval of essential
medicines, the Fund urges expedited approval for products that have been
accepted by the WHO pre-qualification project or authorized by a stringent
NDRA, one that is a member of the Pharmaceutical Inspection Convention/Scheme
and/or the International Conference of Harmonisation.[126]
Since quality can deteriorate during distribution, the
Global Fund also requires rigorous quality control testing thorough various
stages of the supply chain from manufacture to final consumption. This testing too will need to be performed
by a high-quality lab.
The WHO has just released a study documenting the growing
problem of substandard and counterfeit medicines estimating that up to 25% of
medicines consumed in poor countries are deficient and that the deficiencies
are particularly problematic for high-markup products treating HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malaria.[127] “Trade in substandard and counterfeit
medicines is most prevalent in countries with weak drug regulation control and
enforcement, scarcity and/or erratic supply of basic medicines, unregulated
markets and unaffordable prices,” according to the WHO press release. The risk of counterfeit medicines also rise
“[w]hen prices of medicines are high and price differentials between identical
products exist,” inducing some consumers to seek medicines outside of the
normal supply system. This finding
highlights one of the dangers of market segmentation whereby drug companies
seek to maintain higher profit margins in private sector sales at the same time
that discount prices are available in the public or NGO sector. To redress these recurrent problems, the WHO
recommends legislative reform to strengthen enforcement powers in drug
regulatory authorities, strategies to reduce corruption and criminal activity,
and international cooperation like its own pre-qualification program for
HIVAIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria medicines.
The net impact of the Global Fund’s concerns about quality,
bolstered by the recent WHO report, is that developing countries will need to
be quite strict about quality issues both for imported and domestically
produced drugs. Absent the Global Fund
rule, there had been some concern that developing countries with weak NDRA’s
might be tempted to cut corners to register substandard domestically produced
medicines. Obviously this would be
disastrous for the long-term control of infectious diseases and for treatment
of chronic conditions; moreover, it would waste scarce fiscal resources. In sum, developing countries should be
concerned about the quality of medicines not only price or country of
origin. The required Global Fund
standard is lowest price for drugs of assured quality – both sides of the
equation are important.
Global Fund – IP issues
“[I]n
making its funding decisions, the Fund will support proposals which … [a]re
consistent with international law and agreements, respect intellectual property
rights, such as TRIPS, and encourage efforts to make quality drugs and products
available at the lowest possible prices for those in need.” (Framework Document, GFATM/B1/doc 4.)
“The
Fund encourages recipients to comply with national laws and applicable
international obligations in the field of intellectual property, including the
flexibilities provided in the TRIPS … agreement and referred to in the Doha
declaration, in a manner that achieves the lowest possible price for products
of assured quality.” (GF/B4/2)
The Global Fund “encourages” countries to procure products
that are legal under national and international law, but it has not undertaken
a close review of recipients’ decisions in this regard. The Global Fund takes special pains to
emphasize the use of flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha
Declaration. (Given the adoption of the
Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement, its flexibilities should also now be
considered.) At a minimum these
flexibilities including sourcing from no-patent countries, parallel
importation, non-predominate export pursuant to a “normal” compulsory license,
and export pursuant to a “special” paragraph 6 compulsory license. However, there is also room for countries to
source from countries using an Article 30 limited exception to patent
rights. This option was not explicitly
endorsed at the WTO, but neither was it specifically rebuffed.
A second and important feature of the Global Fund IP rule
is that recipients are encouraged to use flexibilities “in a manner that
achieves the lowest possible price.”
This requirement is designed to prevent “gaming” by developing countries
with respect to their sourcing choices.
For example, some countries might be tempted to issue compulsory
licenses for local production even where that production will be uneconomical
with respect to the global market, where the lowest price for fixed-dose
combination ARVs is now below $140/year.
Although a country would certainly be able to preferentially source
local products drawing from its own fiscal reserves, in using Global Fund money
it is obligated to import cheapest medicines from abroad whether generic or
proprietary. As a practical matter,
this “lowest-cost” requirement, in conjunction with the
intellectual-property-legality standard, requires developing countries to issue
compulsory licenses open to both local production and importation so that they might eventually choose the most cost
effective alternative.
At present, it is unclear whether Global Fund rules can be
bent to permit developing countries to pay a domestic-production premium out of
their own funds (lowest cost price reimbursed by the Global Fund, domestic
premium paid by the recipient).[128] In the long run, however, this choice is
terribly inefficient as it wastes scarce resources on commodity purchases that
could more wisely be spent on health care infrastructure and systems and
enhanced salaries for health care workers.
3.2 U.S. EPAR
policies
The U.S. has been less than forthcoming about its planned
procurement policies for its Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. Given the historic alignment of U.S. policy
and that of the pharmaceutical industry, however, it seems likely that U.S.
purchasing decisions will be slanted toward purchases of price-discounted,
patented medicines. Evidence for this
preference comes from direct statements by certain administration officials who
downplay the likelihood of generic purchases and instead tout the benefits of
buying “American” and buying drugs of “highest” quality.[129] In addition, USAID procurement policy has
long favored purchase of U.S. products with U.S. donor funds, even when such
procurement is not cost-competitive.
On the other hand, President Bush in his 2003 State of the
Union address referred specifically to AIDS drugs costing only $300/year. Since costs that low were only seen in the
generic sector, the President’s statement seemed to be an indirect endorsement of
generic purchases (or a not-too-subtle message to major drug companies to drop
their prices even further to be cost-competitive). The President’s implicit endorsement was subsequently confirmed
by some administration officials who essentially said that the U.S. would
permit purchase of generic drugs as long as the purchases were TRIPS compliant
and permitted by national law. In this
regard, one could certainly expect that U.S. trade lawyers will be scrutinizing
sourcing decisions more rigorously than the Global Fund does, but it remains
possible that the U.S. will indeed permit developing countries to source
generic medicines at low cost whether produced domestically or internationally
as long as all relevant intellectual property rules have been scrupulously
followed.
6. ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENT GENERIC MANUFACTURE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
ECONOMIES-OF-SCALE
As discussed previously, developing countries have important
incentives to develop their own indigenous capacity to manufacture
pharmaceutical products. They can do so
by encouraging a wide variety of entities ranging from purely domestic
companies to subsidiaries of multinational companies that site a relatively
large facility within the country.
Similarly, they can encourage local production that covers a wide range
of productive activity varying from producers with innovative and manufacturing
capacities of both active pharmaceutical ingredients and final formulations to
producers that merely package already formulated medicines.[130] Developing countries can encourage this
expanded capacity lawfully under TRIPS both by direct subsidy and by their own
procurement preferences for pharmaceutical products manufactured locally. However, the allure of local production may
blind some developing countries to its true cost. That cost may include decreased future flexibility to rely on
Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement importation options and the long-term
payment of excessive prices for medicines that can be sourced much more cheaply
from overseas.
In this regard, understanding the issue of economies-of-scale is
vitally important. The U.S. has long
understood the issue of advantageous economies-of-scale for its own
pharmaceutical industry:
The foundation of free trade embodied in the WTO system is
the removal of conditions that lead to inefficiencies in global trade. The WTO has long recognized the
trade-distorting nature of local content, import substitution, and local
production requirements. We note that
the non-discrimination clause of Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement is built on
this foundation.
Pharmaceuticals are among the best examples of products
where these principles are true.
Pharmaceuticals can be efficiently produced in a small number of
locations and transported through international trade to markets needing those
products. Such efficiencies of
production and distribution lead to lower prices and faster supply of products
to meet demands, including those caused by public health emergencies.[131]
Although the U.S. was trying to valorize its own
proprietary drug industry with this statement and although there is little
evidence that U.S. pharmaceutical monopolists have ever reduced their prices
because of manufacturing efficiencies, economies-of-scale are demonstrably
important to generic industries as recognized by Canada in the EC-Canada
pharmaceutical products case at the WTO.[132]
Smaller countries that … have generic
industries [do] not have domestic markets sufficiently large to enable those
industries to operate on an economic scale.
Those industries [have] to export in order to be able to manufacture in
sufficient quantities to achieve economies-of-scale, so that domestic consumers
[can] receive the benefits of cost-effect generic products.[133]
The efficiency concerns stated publicly by the U.S. and
Canada confirm earlier studies that concluded that local production of
pharmaceuticals did not make good sense for most developing countries because
of diseconomies-of-scale and technological demands. The few exceptions were countries like China, India, Brazil,
Thailand, Egypt, Mexico, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Argentina that had large local
markets and the ability to produce active pharmaceutical ingredients.[134] That number may have grown to include other
countries with productive capacity such as South Africa. But, if the economic cost of creating local
pharmaceutical capacity is excessive, if the quality of products is doubtful,
or if the final pricing is not competitive with existing foreign generic
manufacturers because of diseconomies-of-scale or otherwise, then “this ‘local
production solution’ will be no solution at all.”[135] Moreover, developing countries will have to
be willing to take a hard look at other factors affecting competitiveness
including: a shortage of skilled labor;
a weak financial sector; diminished flows of foreign direct investment; and
other disadvantages facing smaller enterprises and smaller countries.[136] They will also have to consider the economic
viability of single-drug facilities, for example, those that might primarily or
exclusively produce fixed-dose combination ARVs.
Based on empirical research, Kaplan and others have
concluded that
[T]here is a ‘critical mass’ of industrial and socioeconomic development and human and technical resources that must be reached before any ‘indigenous’ pharmaceutical industry can survive. These include:
·
GDP great than about $100 billion
·
Population greater than about 100 million
·
Sufficient numbers of the population enrolled in secondary and
tertiary education
·
Competitiveness index (UNIDO) grater than about 0.15
·
A net position pharmaceutical balance of trade.[137]
These hesitancies about the economics of local production
are compounded by additional concerns about quality assurance. As discussed in subsection 5.1, the issue of
quality assurance is not just of function of good manufacturing practice but
also a function of quality control based on a functioning drug regulation and
registration system, a functioning drug quality control laboratory, an
efficient system for storing and transferring drugs, and an enforceable regime
of drug legislation.[138]
Accordingly, there is considerable uncertainty about
ability of smaller developing countries to achieve efficiencies in drug
manufacture especially with respect to active ingredients and with respect to
harder to formulate medicines. Some
experts believe that only regional economies-of-scale can be achieved in
sub-Saharan Africa and that South Africa is the only country with a reasonable
chance to develop an African regional capacity.[139] Other experts, and indeed some countries
assisting local production, appear to believe that smaller finishing plants can
be efficient in making formulations and in labeling and packaging drugs for
local consumption.[140] This debate is surely important to
developing countries and they should investigate these issues very closely lest
too many countries erroneously assume that each can become a major regional
supplier. And they should not lose
sight of the importance of accessing standard quality, generic medicines at
lowest cost thereby speeding and easing the flow of treatment to poor people
bearing an unbearable burden of disease.
Whatever sourcing decisions they make,
developing countries should seek to reduce barriers to generic entry and to
generic companies achieving economies-of-scale. In order to invest in producing medicines efficiently, generic
manufacturers need predictable markets, regulatory access, freedom from
patent-infringement lawsuits, and relief from ancillary trade agreements that
undermine their ability to sell standard-quality medicines cheaply. They also need some profit motivation.
7. EMERGING
NEGATIVE IMPACT OF BILATERAL AND PLURILATERAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS ON
POST-DOHA AND POST-PARAGRAPH 6 FLEXIBILITIES.
It would be gratifying to report that developed countries suffered
a secure setback in their battle for TRIPS-plus intellectual property
protections via the Doha Declaration and Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement
and that developing country solidarity and multilateralism restrained U.S.
unilateralism. However, the persistence
of the U.S. and other developed countries in pursuing the interests of their
pharmaceutical industries has not yet ceased.
Thus, at the same time that developed countries, led by the U.S., were
enacting a strategy of export containment in the WTO, the U.S. in particular
was negotiating bilateral and regional trade agreement with greatly enhanced
intellectual property protections.
To this end, in the past year the U.S. has concluded negotiations
with Chile and Singapore and is negotiating further bilateral agreements with
Morocco, Thailand, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Australia. In addition, it is pursuing regional
negotiations in Central America, the Andes, Southern Africa, and the entire Western
Hemisphere. In each of these negotiations,
the U.S. is seeking to impose TRIPS-plus intellectual property protections that
would dramatically undermine both the Doha Declaration and the Paragraph 6
Implementation Agreement.
For example, even in Africa, at the heart of the AIDS pandemic, the
USTR is undertaking trade negotiations to transplant U.S.-style patent
protections into the South African Customs Union.[141] In order to meet “standards of protection
similar to that found in U.S. law,” SACU nations would be required:
·
to limit compulsory licenses to national emergencies, to
governmental, non-commercial use, and to anti-competitive practices remedies
only;
·
to bar parallel trade;
·
to extend patent monopolies for administrative delays;[142]
·
to link drug registration rights to patent status;
·
to enhance protections for clinical trial testing data by
providing at least five years of data exclusivity, thereby precluding
registration of medicines produced under compulsory licenses;
·
to adopt criminal enforcement for patent violations, including
improvidently granted compulsory licenses.
In sum, the proposed negotiation objectives would completely
eviscerate the Doha flexibilities, dramatically increase IP protection, and
reduce trade in affordable generic medicines.
More particularly, in the context of the production-for-export
problem, the CAFTA, SACU, and FTAA negotiations could be even more disastrous.
For example, in the FTAA, the U.S. is the presumed sponsor of a troubling
bracketed provision that would explicitly prohibit compulsory licensing for
export (8.64 (6) (b)). In this regard,
PhRMA has been very explicit that it is advocating this export ban in South
Africa saying: “The USG should seek to limit
the scope of Government use authority to exclude the possibility of Government
use for the purpose of export, or for sale to the general public.”[143] Basically, PhRMA and the USTR, by limiting
compulsory licenses to national emergency and public non-commercial use, seek
to prevent exports.[144]
If this no-export ban were to be imposed on SACU nations, then
South Africa would be prevented from being a supplier of standard quality
generic medicines to other SACU nations or to the subcontinent as a whole. If the ban were imposed on Brazil in FTAA
negotiations, it too would be barred from becoming a regional supplier for
generics in Latin America. And if the
ban is imposed on Thailand in its bilateral negotiations, Asia would lose an
important regional supplier. Since regional
and international production-for-export of generic medicines is necessary for
countries with little or no efficient manufacturing capacity, excluding one of
the few technically competent Africa producers, all of the technically
competent South America producers, and one of the more efficient Asia producers
would be a huge blow to poor countries trying to import affordable generic
medicines. Thus, any effort by U.S.
free trade negotiators to sabotage pro-public health interpretations of TRIPS
that would otherwise[145]
permit the export of low-cost generic medicines is morally and legally
unacceptable. In this regard, there is a strong argument
that the persistent effort by the U.S. to expand patent protections in the face
of worst health crisis in the last six hundred years violates legal limits on
U.S. trade policy[146]
and an even stronger argument that it violates international human rights
norms.[147]
To
counteract this danger, developing countries should unite to adopt a
collaborative position resisting any efforts to add TRIPS-plus measures to the
intellectual property provisions of regional or bilateral trade
agreements. TRIPS, the Doha
Declaration, and the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement should be seen as
creating an impenetrable ceiling for intellectual property protections,
particularly in the pharmaceutical sector.
Only by uniting can developing countries resist being picked off
one-by-one and region-by-region by U.S. trade negotiators.
8. THE SHORT-TERM MANDATE FOR AN ARTICLE 30
LIMITED EXCEPTION FOR ACCESS TO EXPORTED GENERICS AND A LONG-TERM MANDATE FOR
EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT FOR MEDICINES.
A deep paradox of developed-countries’ trade policy
and their persistent effort to maintain and expand the proprietary industry’s
hegemony in developing country markets is that these markets, where the AIDS, TB,
and malarial pandemics are at their worst, comprise so little of the global
pharmaceutical market. A frequent
argument from the USTR and PhRMA is that intellectual property rights must be
protected and even expanded to provide incentives for future research and
development and that the interest of consumers in continued path-breaking
medical discoveries is jeopardized if patent protections are not maintained
worldwide. To rebut this concern, one
need only survey the current structure of the global drug market where the
world pharmaceutical market (2000) was estimated at $406 billion dollars. North America, the European Union, and Japan
purchased 80% of that total, by dollar volume, and all of them have robust systems
of patent protection which protect patent holders against generic
competition. On the other hand, all of
Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Africa, the so-called developing world,
combined for only 12% of the global market in 2000 (despite having 80% of the
world’s population).[148] Sub-Saharan Africa, the center of the
HIV/AIDS pandemic, comprises a miniscule 1.3% of worldwide drug sales and the
poor countries of Asia and the Indian subcontinent only add another 3.9%.
Accordingly, pharmaceutical companies make the vast
bulk of their profits on secure sales in rich countries that have strong
protections for intellectual property rights.
Moreover, drug companies earn a very handsome rate of return, on their
sales - 18.5% - which places them at the top of all U.S. industry groups, five
times the all-industry average. As a
result, the largest U.S. pharmaceutical concerns earned nearly $37 billion
dollars in 2001, even after deducting expenses for current research and
development. In sum, the pharmaceutical
industry is remarkably profitable (and has been so for many years) and its
ability to conduct future research and development is in no real jeopardy based
on anything that happens to low-volume sales of some of its products in some
developing countries facing compelling public health dilemmas.
However, even if the drug companies were not already
making huge profits in rich countries, more than enough to fund future research
and development, are they losing profits by preventing access to medicines in
developing countries? To the contrary,
tens of millions of poor people are going without access to affordable patented
medicines, and drug companies aren’t making a dime on those non-sales. How exactly are drug companies being hurt
if someone else makes generic drugs much more cheaply, sells them to customers
previously priced out of the market, and then pays a royalty, even a small one,
to the patent holder, as they must under existing compulsory license
rules? The worst that will happen to
drug companies is that they might lose some highly profitable sales to a narrow
spectrum of rich elites in developing countries if their market segmentation
strategy fails. However, this is a small price to pay in order to dramatically
increase access to life-saving medicines for the other 98% of the population in
poor countries. Accordingly, PhRMA’s
intellectual property fundamentalism in developing countries produces little
real benefit to drug companies.
As a result of coordinated global campaigns and
activists’ strategic focus on drug pricing and intellectual property barriers,
the prices for antiretroviral therapy have plummeted in three and a half years
from $10,439/year to $140.[149] As a result of those same campaigns, generic
producers are now empowered to produce fixed-dose combinations, endorsed by the
World Health Organization, that permit patients to take one pill twice a day
rather than two dozen at widely different times, thereby facilitating patient
compliance and reducing drug resistance.
Prices have plummeted because people imagined and believed that lives in
developing countries are worth saving and worth fighting for. As a result, for the same amount of money
that could buy branded and patented medicines for 20,000 rich people in Africa
in 2000, the world can now buy generic ARVs for 2,000,000 Africans living with
AIDS by 2005.
When unified in the aftermath of the
anthrax scare, developing countries succeeded in overpowering the U.S. and
producing the Doha Declaration. Now,
they are letting the developed world juggernaut to conditionalize recent advances to the point of rendering them
difficult, if not impossible to enforce..
Not only should they have rejected the Chairperson’s draft statement,
they should they have rejected the earlier Motta text as well. It contained too many compromises of vital
public health interests, too many substantive and procedural
inefficiencies. Developing countries
would have done better to rely on the text of the Doha Declaration and the
baseline flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement.
Then, willing generic producers could have exported under Article 30 of
TRIPS (permitting limited exceptions to patent rights) to willing importers
that have issued compulsory licenses.
People living with treatable diseases need a full-size, fully
operational Doha Declaration,
Accordingly, the final recommendation of
this paper is that developing countries return to the bargaining table and undo
the damage done by the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement and Chairperson’s
Statement. Instead of relying on a
highly conditioned, limited, and procedurally burdensome Article 31(f)
solution, developed countries should go back to the simplified approach they
championed for so long and that was subsequently endorsed by the European
Parliament, the WHO, and leading NGOs around the world – a limited exception
under Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement.
|
Article 30 Production-for-Export Exception Under
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement and pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration, manufacturing shall be allowed:
(1) if the pharmaceutical product is intended for export to a third
country that has issued a compulsory license for that product, or where a
patent is not in force, (2) if there is a request to that effect by the
competent public health authorities of that third country arising from a
specified public health needs, (3) if that third country certifies that it
has insufficient current capacity in its pharmaceutical sector to manufacture
the medicines efficiently, and (4) if low-cost methods are utilized to
differentiate the labeling and packaging of the product from the patented
version. |
Although this particular language may
not be perfect, an Article 30 solution is vastly superior as an easy-to-use
mechanism for getting assured quality generics to developing countries in need. Having been forced into a strategic retreat
by U.S. intransigence, developing countries should not solemnize an ineffective
mechanism that locks in patent holders’ prerogatives and lock outs the most
cost-effective forms of generic production.
Tinkering with the TRIPS Agreement and
trying to forestall even more draconian intellectual property protections
affecting access to medicines may, in the long run, be an ineffective
strategy. The TRIPS system was designed,
fundamentally, to protect the interests of intellectual property industries in
the Global North at the expense of consumers in the Global South. That’s problematic enough when the product
at stake is a form of entertainment or a fancy software package, but it is far
more problematic when lives are at stake, as they are with respect to access to
essential medicines.
Therefore, I recommend that Task Force 5
commission an additional consultation on alternatives to the intellectual
property system both with respect to the development of medicines and to
access. In this regard, treating
medicines as global public goods is a particularly attractive theory. Public goods theory imagines that benign and
well-funded public institutions can take over the supervision of research,
development, and manufacture of new drugs for neglected diseases and in
addition supply large quantities of low cost medicines to poor consumers.[150] Although a detailed exploration of this and
other alternatives to the patent and data exclusivity regime is well beyond the
scope of this paper, it does behoove public health activists on the Task Force
to imagine a world where medicines are not guarded by intellectual property
rules that present nearly insurmountable barriers to both innovation and
access. Despite the attractiveness of
such an exploration, however, a long-term revolution in intellectual property
rules offers little short-term solace for tens of millions of people living
with diseases today that will kill them tomorrow. For these fellow world citizens pragmatic battles in the thicket
of existing rules must also be waged.
MDG-essential
medicines.2.doc
[1] United Nations Millennium Declaration (2000): Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other disease, targets: have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence and spread of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other major diseases.
[2] UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2003, 5.
[3]
WHO declared HIV/AIDS a global emergency on September 22, 2003. WHO Fact Sheet 274,
<http://www/int.mediacentre/factsheets/2003/fs274/en/print/html>
(September 2003). At the Barcelona
International AIDS Conference in July of 2002, WHO committed to treating 3
million people living with AIDS by the end of 2005.
[4] Six million people living with HIV/AIDS in developing countries need immediate access to affordable medicines or they will die within two years. Despite this compelling need, only 300,000 developing world patients are receiving antiretroviral therapy including 50,000-75,000 in all of Africa. One-third of the developing country total was being treating in Brazil, which provides universal free access to ARV therapy. WHO, A Commitment to Expanded Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment, 1 <http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/arv/
who_hiv_2002_24.pdf> (Dec. 2002); see Jane Galvão, Access to antiretroviral drugs in Brazil, <http://image.thelancet.com/extras/01art9038web.pdf> (Nov. 5, 2002).
[5] “Noncommunicable diseases such as cardio-vascular diseases, cancer and diabetes are clearly on the increase in African countries. According to the WHO Regional Office for Africa, if this situation is not contained, sixty percent of deaths in the Region by the year 2020 will be caused by NCDs, compared to forty-one percent in 1990.” WHO, Non-communicable diseases: Regional Strategy for 2000-2010, 28 August – 2 September 2000. <http://www.afro.who.int/press/2000/regionalcommittee/rc5006.html>.
[6] Pharmaceuticals have ranked as the most profitable sector in Fortune 500 rankings for the past three decades. The top ten U.S. drug makers increased their profits by 32% from $28 billion in 2000 to $37 billion in 2001. Together these ten companies report profits of 18.5 cents for every dollar of sales, eight times higher than the median for all Fortune 500 industries. Scott Gottlieb, Drug Companies Maintain “Astounding” Profits, 324 B.M.J. 1054 (May 4, 2002).
[7] Art. 8(1), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 81 <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf> (1994).
[8] Mark Schoofs, Clinton Program Would Help Poor Nations Get AIDS Drugs, Wall Street Journal (October 23, 2003).
[9] Major pharmaceutical companies have offered price discounts through the WHO co-sponsored Accelerating Access Initiative. However, this Initiative has gotten off to a painfully slow start such that only 36,000 additional patient received medicines between May of 2000 and March of 2002. WHO & UNAIDS Progress Report, Accelerating Access Initiative: Widening access to care and support for people living with HIV/AIDS 1-2 (June 2002). Although the figure has now risen to 76,300 people, the conditions that companies impose and the requirement for country-by-country, drug-by-drug negotiations have resulted in a widening, not narrowing, gap in access to treatment.
The concept for an international funding mechanism to fight HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria began at the Okinawa G8 Summit in July 2000. At the urging of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and many national leaders, the concept of the Fund was unanimously endorsed in June 2001 at the first UN General Assembly Special Session to focus on HIV/AIDS. In July 2001 at its meeting in Genoa, G8 leaders committed US $1.3 billion to the Fund.
The Global Fund to Treat AIDS, TB, and Malaria: FAQ <www.globalfundatm.org/faq_gfund.html> (Feb. 2002).
[11] The Bush administration has sent mixed messages about whether it will allow purchases of lowest costs generics or preferred proprietary drugs in its new initiative, see subsection 5.2, infra.
[12] Peter Drahos, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, Oxfam Cost of Medicines Campaign <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/trade/bilateralism_ip.htm> (2001) (discussing the U.S. strategy of using bilateral and regional forums to establish higher intellectual property protections which it then pursues in larger regional and international trade negotiations).
[13] Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Doha, Nov. 9-14 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001).
[14] WT/L/540 (September 2, 2003).
[15] For a detailed history of the political and strategic genesis of the TRIPS agreement as engineered by U.S. knowledge industries, see Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy (New Press, New York, 2003). For a detailed and technical analysis of the background and main policy issues of TRIPS, see UNCTAC/ICTSD Capacity Building Project on Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable Development, TRIPS and Development: Resource Book (Oct. 2002). For a discussion of the flexibilities available to developing countries re TRIPS-compliant implementation, see Carlos Correa, Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in Developing Countries (South Centre, Geneva, 2000). For a discussion of the impact of the TRIPS Agreement and access to medicines, see Karin Timmermans & Togi Hutadjulu, The TRIPS Agreement and Pharmaceuticals: Report of an ASEAN Workshop on the TRIPs Agreement and its Impact on Pharmaceuticals, <http://www.grain.org/docs/asean-tmk-en.pdf> (May 2-4, 2000); Michael Bailey, Ruth Mayne & Dr. Mohga Smith, Fatal Side Effects: Medicine Patents under the Microscope, <http://www.oxfam.org.ul/cutthecost/downloads/policy3.rtf> (Feb. 2001) [Oxfam, Fatal Side Effects].
[16] Oxfam, Fatal Side Effects, supra note 15, at 38.
[17] “In the words of Edmund Pratt of Pfizer, ‘Our combined strength enabled us to establish a global private sector-government network which laid the groundwork for what became TRIPS.’” Id.
[18] “The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology … .” Article 7. Shortly after the adoption TRIPS, a number of developing countries lost a significant number of pharmaceutical facilities including Chile and South Africa.
[19] For an extended discussion of options concerning appropriate use of undisclosed data, see Carlos Correa, Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the Standards of the TRIPS Agreement (South Centre, 2002). The ability of generic producers to compare generic drugs against previously registered medicines to establish bio-equivalent and comparable bio-availability is crucial to avoid cost-prohibitive, time consuming, and wasteful duplication of clinical trials.
[20] See
discussion, infra, subsection 3.2.2.
[21] See
discussion, infra, subsections 3.2.3
and 3.2.4.
[22] See
discussion, infra, subsection 3.2.6.
[23] World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000, Table 5-12.
[24] There is little doubt that the U.S. and European negotiators were intimately aware of the cost implications of the expanded patent protections – they were negotiating at the bequest and often with the assistance of representatives of the pharmaceutical industry. Likewise, India and Brazil seemed knowledgeable about the future impacts of the agreement, but a divide and conquer strategy by the U.S. undermined a potential developing country alliance that opposed grafting monopoly-based intellectual protections on top of a multilateral “free trade” agreement. The main tool that the U.S. used in splitting the incipient alliance was Special 301 Lists and threats of trade sanctions under 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2002), which was amended in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 to include close surveillance of IPRs. For a history this use of bilateral threats, see Drahos with Braithwaite, supra note 15, at 85-107.
[25] Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy (London 2002).
[26] Human Development Report 2001: Making New Technologies Work for Human Development (Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 2001).
[27] Intellectual Property: Balancing Incentives with Competitive Access in Global Economic Prospects, 129-150 (Washington, D.C., 2001).
[28] Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Intellectual Property Rights: Implications for Development (Aug. 2003).
[29] WTO Agreements & Public Health: A Joint Study by the WHO and the WTO Secretariat (2002).
[30] PhRMA [the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America] is the trade association for major proprietary drug companies in the U.S. The international pharmaceutical lobby group is called the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association. When referring to PhRMA, this paper is not just referring to the formal trade association but to the international cartel of patent holders that have pursued mutually advantageous intellectual property strategies often in collaboration with U.S. and European trade negotiators.
[31]
Efforts by the Thai government in 1999-2000 to produce the drug under the compulsory licensing provision of TRIPS, as demanded by Thai NGOs and PLWHAs, failed as the United States government brought intense pressure and made a threat of Special 301 sanctions on Thai exports through its trade arm, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), in clear violation of its obligations under the WTO. In fact, GPO's attempt at procuring raw materials in December 1999 for DDI from a Japanese company (which is also the main supplier to BMS) also failed because of pressure from BMS. Therefore GPO had to turn to Canadian suppliers who charged twice the price. The BMS case in Thailand is a classic example of the overriding profiteering motives of drug multinationals over access to essential medicines for public health, how companies use patents with minor modifications to establish monopolies and extend the period of patent protection, the bullying trade tactics of the U.S. government and its attempts to preserve the monopoly of its transnational drug companies.R. Ramachandran, A patent war in Thailand <http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2003-October/005515.html> (Oct. 15, 2003). [32] See, e.g., Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1999):
[N]one of the funds appropriated under this heading may be available for assistance for the central Government of the Republic of South Africa, until the Secretary of State reports in writing to the appropriate committees of the Congress on the steps being taken by the United State Government to work with the Government of the Republic of South Africa to negotiate the repeal, suspension, or termination of section 15(c) of South Africa’s Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act No. 90 of 1997.
According to U.S. State Department documents and statements at the time, “[multiple federal agencies] have been engaged in an assiduous, concerted campaign to persuade the Government of South Africa to modify the provisions of Article 15(C)” that the U.S. believed violated the TRIPS Agreement. Patricia D. Siplon, AIDS and the Policy Struggle in the United States, 120-21 (Georgetown Press, Washington D.C., 2002). For a discussion of early pro-pharma U.S. trade policy in South Africa, see Patrick Bond, Globalization, Pharmaceutical Pricing and South African Health Policy: Managing Confrontation with U.S. Firms and Politicians, 29 Int’l J. Health Services 768 (1999).
[33] For a brief history of the U.S. WTO complaint against Brazil, see Ellen t’Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 Chi. J. Int’l Law 27, 30-33 (2002).
[34] Siplon, supra note 31, at 121.
[35] Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South Africa v. President of the Republic of South Africa, Case No. 4193/98 (filed Feb. 18, 1998). The lawsuit was unconditionally dismissed in April 2001 following “strong international public outrage.” t’Hoen, supra note 33, at 31.
[36] Siplon, supra note 31, at 123-26. Of particular note,
is the Clinton Executive Order of May 10, 2000, Executive Order 13155, 3 C.F.R.
268 (2000), which in relevant part, reads:
(a ) In administering sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, the United States shall not seek, through negotiation or otherwise, the revocation or revision of any intellectual property law or policy of a beneficiary sub-Saharan African country, as determined by the President, that regulates HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals or medical technologies if the law or policy of the country: (1) promotes access to HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals or medical technologies for affected populations in that country; and (2) provides adequate and effective intellectual property protection consistent with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) referred to in section 101(d)(15) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(15)).
[37] For a detailed account of this collaboration, see Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lighting the Dark Corner at the WTO, 5(2) J. Int’l Econ. Law 469, 480-90 (2002). Developing countries rejected the theory that differential pricing would meet their needs.
[38] U.S. Statement at TRIPS Council Meeting, June 20, 2001,<http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/pharm-policy/2001-June/001175.html>.
[39] Communication from the European Communities and their member states, IP/C/W/280 (June 12, 2001).
[40] See Developing Country Group’s Paper, IP/C/W/296 (June 20, 2001); Draft Ministerial Declaration – Proposal from a Group of Developing Countries, IP/C/W/312 (October 4, 2001).
[41] In making this argument, the U.S. relied heavily on
an unpublished study subsequently published in the fall of 2001. Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs
Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 JAMA 1886, 1888 (Oct.
17, 2001). Although HIV medicines have
not been patented pervasively throughout the developing world, particularly in
sub-Saharan Africa, the
explanation for this pattern of non-uniform patenting is that smaller and
poorer nations do not have markets that warrant the cost of patent
applications. Despite incomplete
patenting, however, there are multiple antiretroviral patents in those few
countries, South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria, that have meaningful market size
and some pharmaceutical capacity.
Similarly, there is a pattern whereby some of the most important
low-dose, low-cost anti-viral medicines are patented in countries where the
disease is concentrated. Low-cost, front-line antiretroviral therapies
involving 3TC, d4T, AZT, Abacavir, and/or Nevirapine are significantly blocked
by patents in countries containing 68% of HIV positive persons in sub-Saharan
Africa. Consumer Project on
Technology et als., Comment on
Attaran/Gillespie-White and PhRMA Surveys of Patents on Antiretroviral drugs in
Africa (Oct. 16, 2001).
[42] Preambular language for a ministerial declaration, contribution from Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States, IP/C/W/313 (October 4, 2001); Non-Paper, Contribution from Canada, the Czeck Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland and the United States <http://lists.essential.org/
pipermail/ip-health/2001-September/001891.html> (September 19, 2001).
[43] Article 65.4. There is now an even longer transitional period for least developed countries (increased from 2006 to 2016), but the short-term prospect that any of them will become large-scale manufacturers and exporters of pharmaceuticals seems remote. See Article 66 of TRIPS and Paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration.
[44] The problem does not arise simply with respect to medicines newly patented in 2005 or thereafter. TRIPS already has a “mail-box” rule whereby developing countries are obligated to establish mechanisms for receiving, processing, and establishing “priority-in-time” for pharmaceutical patent applications. Furthermore, developing countries have to grant exclusive distribution rights to the patent applicant when certain prescribed conditions were satisfied. Article 70. Thus, the mailbox rule effectively precludes generic manufacturers in developing countries that do not recognize patents on medicines or product patents from producing “copies” of medicines described in pending “mailbox” applications. Stated differently, patent applicants have significant and exclusive market advantages with respect to post-1995 discoveries even before the full adoption of TRIPS in developing countries.
[45] See, Statement on the Considerations for Paragraph 6 Modalities Delivered by Kenya on Behalf of the African Group, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Thailand at the TRIPS Council Meeting on March 5, 2002, IP/C/M/35 (March 22, 2002); Joint Communication from the African Group in the WTO, IP/C/351 (June 24, 2002); Communication from Brazil on behalf of Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, China, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Venezuela IP/C/W/355 (June 24, 2002); South African Non-Paper on Substantive and Procedural Elements of a Report to the General Council under Paragraph 6 of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Job(02)/156 (November 5, 2002); Communication from Kenya, the Coordinator of the African Group, IPC/W/389 (November 14, 2002).
[46] A partial list of international NGO’s active in the campaign for access to treatment and for simplified Article 30 procedures includes: Oxfam International; Action Aids Alliance; Consumer Project on Technology US; Health Global Access Project (GAP); Health Action International; Lawyers Collective' HIV/AIDS Unit, India; Medecins sans Frontieres; Thai NGO Coalition on AIDS and Thai Network of People with HIV/AIDS; Third World Network; and Treatment Action Campaign, South Africa.
[47] This is the solution expressly endorsed on September
17, 2002, by the World Health Organization:
[T]he limited exception under Article 30 is the most consistent with
this public health principle. This
solution will give WTO Members expeditious authorization, as requested by the
Doha Declaration, to permit third parties to make, sell and export medicines
and other health technologies to address public health needs.
It
is also the solution implicitly endorsed by the UK Commission on Intellectual Property
Rights which emphasized the importance of economies-of-scale in attracting
generic producers. And, finally, it is the solution temporarily endorsed by the
European Parliament to amend its medicines regulation scheme:
Manufacturing shall be allowed if the medicinal product is intended for
export to a third country that has issued a compulsory license for that
product, or where a patent is not in force and if there is a request to that
effect of the competent public health authorities of that third country.
Amendment 196 to the DIRECTIVE 2001/83/EC of the
European Parliament (since rejected).
[48] Developing countries championed an explicit Article 30 solution right up until the fall of 2002, though it is notable that the South African Non-Paper of November 5, supra note 45, and the Communication from Kenya, the Coordinator of the African Group, supra note 45, both fail to mention Article 30 directly.
[49] These measures include parallel importation,
relaxation of the predominately for domestic use rule in Article 31(f) of the
TRIPS Agreement, and use of the limited exception option in Article 30 of the
TRIPS Agreement.
[50] Communication from the United States, IP/C/W/340 (March 14, 2002); Second Communication from the United States, IP/C/W/358 (July 9, 2002).
[51] The U.S. first relaxed its insistence on market segmentation, which theretofore had excluded the for-profit sector. Second, it dropped its insistence on production by developing countries only, but only after this strategy had driven a partial wedge into the developing country coalition, essentially raising questions among some Africa countries whether India and Brazil were pursuing an industrial policy option that would undermine the development of pharmaceutical capacity in Africa. Finally, it agreed to allow more efficient regional trade of generics in WTO-sanctioned regional trading groups, so long as the groups contained at least 50% least developed countries.
[52] Draft Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, JOB(02)/217 <http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/wto12162002.html> (December 16, 2002).
[53] The U.S. position on the scope of disease issue was that the Paragraph 6 solution should only cover “grave public health crises associated with HIV/AIDS, malaria, or tuberculosis and other infectious epidemics of comparable scale and gravity.”
[54] Ambassador Eduardo Pérez Motta of Mexico who chaired the TRIPS Council told the General Council of the WTO on December 20, 2002, that intensive consultations had not resolved differences over the diseases that would be covered by the draft decision on intellectual property and health. WTO Press Release <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres02_e/pr329_e.htm> (December 20, 2002).
[55]
Europe and Japan backed the U.S. attempt to
dramatically limit the scope of diseases by jointly proposing a list of
tropical diseases most of which had no effective treatment whatsoever or which
had no viable medical treatment still under patent. "This decision applies to public health problems
arising from yellow fever, plague, cholera, meningococcal disease, African
trypanosomiasis, dengue, influenza, HIV/AIDS, leishmaniasis, TB, malaria,
hepatitis, leptospirosis, pertussis, poliomyelitis, schistosomiasis, typhoid
fever, typhus, measles, shigellosis, haemorrhagic fevers, and arbovirues and
other epidemics of comparable gravity and scale including those that might
arise in the future whether due to natural occurrence, accidental release or
deliberate use.”
PhRMA/US/Korea/EC/Mexico proposed footnote (December 20, 2002)
<http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/listofdiseases12202002.html>. When Europe asked
the WHO to broker the list of diseases, (“When requested by a Member, the World
Health Organization shall give its advice as to the occurrence in an importing
Member, or the likelihood thereof, of any other public health problem,” EU
Draft Proposal for a Compromise Solution (January 7, 2003)), the WHO politely
but firmly declined, (interview with German Velasquez <http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/
velasquez01102003.html> (January 10, 2003)), sending the negotiators back to the drawing board.
[56] See JOB(03)/177 < http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/trips_stat_28aug03_e.htm> (August 28, 2003).
[57] “This Decision was adopted by the General Council in light of a statement read out by the Chairman which can be found in JOB(03/177).” At the very least, developed countries will argue that the Chairperson’s Statement represents some interpretive guidance with respect to the intention of Member States in adopting the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement.
[58] See subsection 3.2, infra.
[59] One of the first instances of possible narrowing of the scope of Paragraph 6 implementation was statements by the Canadian government that it was considering disease limitations in its proposed amendments to its Patent Act. A concentrated campaign led by Canadian NGOs has defeated that threat.
[60] “We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health. …[W]e affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner to supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.” (Emphasis added.) Paragraph 4 makes no reference to grave public health problems recognized in Paragraph 1, nor does it even make reference to the non-restrictive list of diseases, “HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics,” listed in Paragraph 1.
[61] Those objectives and principles in TRIPS specifically include Article 8.1 under which “Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health… .” [Emphasis added.]
[62] Hong Kong China, Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Macao China, Mexico, Qatar, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Turkey, United Arab Emirates. Chairperson’s Statement, supra note 56.
[63] Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Id.
[64] The current threat by Brazil to import three generic ARVs from India (efavirenz, lopinavir, and nelfinavir) is a perfect example of how this fight might play out in the future. Brazil May Break Patents on Merck & Co., Roche, and Abbot Lab AIDS Drugs <http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2003-August/005132.html> (August 21, 2003). It is important to remember, however, that the current Brazil threat to import is not subject to Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement because it involves generics that India can still legally produce. If the Agreement did apply, the U.S. would certainly argue that Brazil has capacity to manufacture generic ARVs – it has done so in the past and it has already reverse-engineered the new ARVs. However, Brazil would counter that it cannot make the new generics quickly and perhaps that it cannot do so efficiently compared to the lower cost of imported Indian generics.
The U.S. insisted on a forum for making these kinds of objections and for having the TRIPS Council and even the WTO General Council "review" the operation of the production for export solution. One can imagine the U.S. complaining that the solution is being abused and that too many countries are seeking import licenses. Developing countries tried to limit this review and argued that the required documentation of incapacity need be skeletal at best, but now they and generic producers must worry about after-the-fact challenges to import licenses. Once again, one can imagine the reluctance of a generic producer to invest in productive, export capacity and to begin to make medicines only the have the import license pulled because of U.S./TRIPS Council review or because of behind-the-scenes U.S. bullying.
[65] Organisation Africaine de la Propriete Intellectuelle (16 members) and African Regional Industrial Property Association (15 members).
[66] See, e.g., WIPO Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty, Options for Future Development of International Search and Examination: Making Greater Use of International Reports, PCT/R/WG/5/9 (Sept. 19, 2003).
[67] So far Cosmos Pharmaceuticals Ltd. of Kenya, Aspen Pharmacare of South Africa, Kimia Farma of Indonesia, Brazilian supported companies in Genin Republic, Ghana, and Nigeria, a Cuban supported firm in Namibia, Shanghai Desano Biopharmaceutical of China, two unidentified companies in Ethiopia, and perhaps others have announced intentions to manufacture generic medicines.
[68] Chairperson’s Statement, supra note 56.
[69] Reports in the press have argued that the text is designed to limit drug use in the importing country to public, non-commercial use (Wall St. Journal 8/28/03), that it applies to both locally produced generics and imported ones (Kaiser Daily HIV/AIDS Report 8/28/03), and that developing countries should not take measure to promote a domestic pharmaceutical industry (TWN Info Service on WTO Issues 8/27/03).
[70] In a way, there is a refreshing frankness in the nakedness of the U.S./PhRMA position - "we don't want generic drug companies to make money, we want them to operate on a humanitarian, nonprofit basis even while we pursue monopoly-enhanced profit maximization." Confirming this objective, in Montreal, at a July 30 press conference, USTR Zoellick expressly said that the U.S. does not was the new post-Doha system to become a loophole for creating a commercial export industry. Inside U.S. Trade <http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2003-August/005045.html> (September 1, 2003). Zoellick and PhRMA have consistently charged that the production-for-export system could be "abused" by the generic drug industries in Brazil, China, and most especially India. To limit that “abuse,” the U.S./PhRMA team have attempted to limit markets by excluding middle-income developing countries and by excluding medicines for most diseases. Here, they tried to go even further - they would let generic producers export, but only on a hypothetical "humanitarian and non-profit" basis.
[71] Aspen Pharmacare of South Africa, one of the Clinton Foundation’s suppliers (the others are Cipla, Ranbaxy, and Matrix, all of India), is already on record that it will earn a wafer thin margin of profit. Amar Kahn, Clinton Aspen to Cut Price of AIDS Drugs, Business Day, Cape Town <http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200310240136.html > (October 24, 2003).
[72] Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement, supra note 14.
[73] Id.
[74]
Chairperson’s Statement, supra note
56. The Statement extended product
differentiated rules to cover finished products produced from Paragraph 6
imported active ingredients. “In this
regard, the provisions of paragraph 2(b)(ii) apply not only to formulated
pharmaceuticals produced and supplied under the system but also to active
ingredients produced and supplied under the system and to finished products
produced using such active ingredients.”
Id.
[75] DG Shah’s comments on Draft Chairman’s Statement (August 26, 2003) <http://lists.essential.org/
pipermail/ip-health/2003-August/005139.html>.
[76] Id.
[77] Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement, supra note 14.
[78] Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement, supra note 14, Paragraph 2(a), (b)(iii), and (c).
[79] Non-exclusive voluntary licenses with relaxed geographical limitations could have a number of advantages. In the best-case scenario, the patent holder could transfer technology and manufacturing know-how to the voluntary licensee which might produce greater efficiencies and ensure quality. In addition, the patent holder would ordinarily allow its licensee to obtain registration by comparing bio-availability and bio-equivalence of the generic product to confidential data previously filed with the drug registration authority.
[80] Prior negotiation is not required under Article 31 (b) and (k) of the TRIPS Agreement where the license is being sought with respect to: (1) an emergency or other matter of extreme urgency (note: HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria are presumptively such emergencies, Doha Declaration, Paragraph 5(c)); (2) governmental, non-commercial use; and (3) remedies for anti-competitive practices.
[81] Article 31(c) limits a license to the purpose for which it was authorized; Article 31(g) mandates termination when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to reoccur; and the Annex to the Implementation Agreement limits it to the period of time that local capacity is insufficient. In the event of ordinary public health licenses, the duration would be at least as long as the public health problem prevails. However, the duration can be shortened further because of increased capacity in the domestic pharmaceutical sector. Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement, supra note 14, Annex, Option ii.
[82] “This notification will be made available publicly by the WTO Secretariat through a page on the WTO website dedicated to this Decision.” Id. fn. 5.
[83] Id. Paragraph 2(a), Annex; Chairperson’s Statement, supra note 56.
[84] Although this result seems unnecessarily duplicative, especially since the company involved probably first sought a voluntary license in the importing country, the current text of Article 31(b) and the failure of the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement to address this second negotiation would seem to require such a ridiculous result.
[85] Despite a requirement of individual determinations, it seems likely that countries could issues guidelines for royalty rates and a presumptive range of royalty rates and that they could shift the burden of persuasion concerning the unreasonableness of the rate to the patent holder.
[86] Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement, supra note 14, Paragraph 2(c).
[87] Id., Paragraph 2(b)(iii).
[88] The risk of pharmaceutical company law suits against governments will become far more likely if NAFTA-like investment rules are ever engrafted into WTO or other bilateral or plurilateral agreements. These clauses give “investors,” meaning foreign companies, rights to take governments to dispute resolution for damages if governmental policy undermines their property rights. Although a full discussion of the investment rule is far beyond the scope of this paper, developing countries should be aware of the future risks of current policy proposals.
[89] Paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration had granted least developed countries an exemption from TRIPS compliance with respect to pharmaceutical products until January 1, 2016. On June 27, 2002, the TRIPS Council voted an addition waiver that would exempt least developed countries from providing five years of market exclusivity to pharmaceutical products under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement.
[90] Novartis receives EMR for Glivec, <http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2003-November/005611.html> (Nov. 14, 2003).
[91] Carlos Correa advocates this approach, Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in Developing Countries, Section X.2 (2000).
[92] Bernard Simon, Curtailing Medicines from Canada, New York Times (November 11, 2003).
[93] Oxfam, Fatal Imbalance, supra note 15, at 24.
[94] Id.
[95] James Love, Access to Medicine and Use of Patents Without the Permission of the Patent Owner: Models for State Practice in Developing Countries, ¶¶ 35-42. Canada’s proposed royalty rate in its pending patent law amendment is a flat 2%.
[96] Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 1069, 1075-1094 (1996).
[97] Consumer Project on
Technology, Additional Notes on
Government Role in the Development of HIV/AIDS Drugs (Feb. 23, 2000).
[98] Public Citizen’s Prescription Drug Update – Drug Company Profits
(Oct. 11, 2000) (a 38% return on equity, making the pharmaceutical industry the
most profitable sector in the U.S. economy).
[99] Cf. Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson and Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facilities Doctrine under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 Antitrust Law Journal 443 (2002); Valentine Korah, The Interface Between Intellectual Property And Antitrust: The European Experience, 69 Antitrust Law Journal 801 (2002).
[100]
Fixed-dose combinations put three different antiretroviral drugs into a single
pill. The WHO endorsed fixed-dose
medicines as a crucial component of its ambitious plan to help the world treat
3 million people living with AIDS by the end of 2005. WHO Scaling up
antiretroviral therapy in resource-limited settings: Treatment guidelines for a public health approach, 9-13 (Dec.
2003); WHO & UNAIDS, Treating 3
Million by 2005: Making it happen – the
WHO Strategy (Dec. 2003).
[101] GlaxoSmithKline does make a fixed dose of its own patented ARVs and one of these, Combivir, is an important therapy. However, Trimune, its three-medicine, fixed-dose combination is no longer a recommended therapy.
[102]
Under Section 8 of the South African Competition
Act “[i]t is prohibited for a dominant firm to – refuse to give a competitor
access to an essential facility when it is economically feasible to do
so.” Under the Act, an “‘essential
facility’ means an infrastructure or resources that cannot reasonably be
duplicated, and without access to which competitors cannot reasonably provide
goods or services to their customers.”
One possible interpretation of the essential facility doctrine, read
against the background of the constitutional duty to interpret legislation to
“promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights” (sec. 39),
including the right of everyone to access to health services (sec. 27), is that
the Competition Act imposes an obligation on the respondents to license their
patented products on reasonable terms when to do so serves public health
priorities. Specifically, it is the
conclusion of this report that the essential facility doctrine should be used
as a basis for compulsory licensing of the products subject to the complaint to
enable consumer access to fixed-dose combination drugs (FDCs) that provide
multiple ARVs in a single pill.
[103] Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, Report of the
Panel, WT/DS114/R, March 17, 2000 [hereinafter Generic Medicines]. In
Generic Medicines, the panel found that manufacture before patent expiration so
as to register a medicine, the so-called “Bolar” exception was lawful, but that
a six-month stock-piling rule was unlawful.
In particular to the point under discussion, Generic Medicines found that any exception which resulted in a
“substantial curtailment of [any exclusionary right] cannot be considered a
limited exception.” Id. at paragraph 7.44.
[104] See Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, Update: Amendment to Canada’s Patent Act to Authorize Export of Generic Pharmaceuticals, www.aidslaw.ca (Nov. 10, 2003).
[105] Carlos Correa, Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 13who/edm/par/2002.3 (WHO Health Economics and Drugs EDM Series No. 12, 2002).
[106] The State itself may apply for compulsory licenses under the Patents Act Section 4 which permits the Minister of State to seek a voluntary license for the use of the patented product for public purposes and in default of such voluntary agreement for the Minister to filed application to the Commissioner of Patents for an involuntary use (compulsory license) on terms or conditions to be set by the Commissioner. Section 78, permits the government to go even further and to "acquire" any invention or patent. Under the Constitution, the government could also "take" the patent and pay just compensation.
[107]
In the only reported case to date, the Supreme
Court of Appeal denied an application for a compulsory license. Syntheta
(Pty) Ltd v Janssen Pharmaceutica NV & Another 1999(1) SA 85 SCA. The
Appellant based its case on two allegations of abuse of patent: (1) the non-working of the patented
invention in South Africa on a commercial scale, or to an adequate extent
(section 56(2)(a)); and (2) the refusal of the patentee to grant a license on
reasonable terms, being the Appellant's offer of 6% royalty on selling price
(section 56(2)(d)). The Court found
against the Appellant on both grounds because of an insufficiency of evidence.
In relation to the subsection 2(d) ground, the court focused on the issue of
public use and need. This focus represents a signal that 'public benefit' can
be an important factor.
The computation of royalties also vexed the Court. It
relied on the English decision of Hoffmann-La
Roche & Co AG's Patent (1973) RPC 601 in suggesting that computation of
royalty should, at a minimum, take account of 3 elements, namely: (1) the patentee's expenditure on research
and development; (2) the patentee's expenditure on promotion; and (3) a
servicing of the capital element to allow a reasonable return on the preceding
two elements.
[108] There is European precedent for a refusal to license a key chemical intermediate for a drug effective against tuberculosis. ICI & Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Comm’n of the E.C., 1974 E.C.R. 223, 250 (1974) (abstracted in Refusal by a Dominant Firm to Sell Raw Materials, 19 Antitrust Bull. 605-618 (1974). The U.K. has also permitted compulsory licensing when a patent owner has refused to grant a license on reasonable terms under section 48 of the Patents Act. In a recent ECJ opinion, the court held that “refusal to grant a license to use protected intellectual property constitutes an abuse [under Section 82 of E.U. competition law]” where the potential licensee has “the intention of producing goods and/or services with different characteristics.” Ingrid Hering, ECJ opinion could lead to uncertainty, http://lists.
Essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2003-October/005412.html (Oct. 13, 2003).
[109] Section 7 states
“A
firm is dominant in a market if – (a)
it has at least 45% of that market; (b) it has at least 35%, but less than 45%,
of that market, unless it can show that it does not have market power; or (c)
it has less than 35% of that market, but has market power.
[110]
(d) engage in
any of the following exclusionary acts, unless the firm concerned can show
technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains which outweigh the
anti-competitive effect of its act –
(i) requiring or inducing a supplier or
customer to not deal with a competitor;
(ii) refusing to supply scarce goods to a
competitor when supplying those goods is economically feasible;
(iii) selling goods or services on condition
that the buyer purchases separate goods or services unrelated to the object of
a contract, or forcing a buyer to accept a condition unrelated to the object of
a contract;
(iv) selling goods or services below their
marginal or average variable cost; or
(v) buying-up a scarce supply of intermediate goods or resources required by a competitor.
[111] Section 1 also provides guidance on interpretation of
the Act:
(2) This Act must
be interpreted –
(a) in a manner
that is consistent with the Constitution and gives effect to the purposes set
out in section 2; and
(b) in compliance
with the international law obligations of the Republic.
(3) Any person
interpreting or applying this Act may consider appropriate foreign and
international law.
Section 2 defines the
purposes:
2. Purpose of Act
The purpose of this
Act is to promote and maintain competition in the Republic in order –
(a) to promote the
efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy;
(b) to provide
consumers with competitive prices and product choices;
(c) to promote
employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South Africans;
(d) to expand
opportunities for South African participation in world markets and recognise
the role of foreign competition in the Republic;
(e) to ensure that
small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate
in the economy; and
(f) to promote a
greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership stakes of
historically disadvantaged persons.
[112] Michael A. Friedman, Henk den Besten, Amir Attaran, Out-licensing: A practical approach for improvement of access to medicines in poor countries, 361 Lancet 341-44 (2003).
[113] This right is subject to a process of consultation between affected Members with respect to anti-competitive licensing agreements.
[114] Some might wonder if a country has sovereign authority to require a patent-holder to relinquish patent rights in another country in order to prevent the issuance of a compulsory license in the subject state. Although countries might not be able regulate truly voluntary license in this way, the voluntary licenses in this instance are part of a compulsory licensing scheme wherein a nation has a sovereign interest in increasing access to medicines to address a valid public health concern. In these special regulatory circumstances, it seem appropriate to regulate geographical restrictions so that generic producers can reach efficient economies-of-scale and thus sell medicines even more cheaply.
[115] F.M. Scherer, The Economics of Drug Patent Licensing, 9, World Bank June 24-25 (May 2003).
[116] Operational Principles for Good Pharmaceutical Procurement (Interagency document). WHO, Geneva, 1999. WHO/EDM/PAR/99.5, <www.who.int/medicines/library/par/who-edm-par-99-5/who-edm-par-99-5.htm>.
[117] See generally, Health Action International, Assured quality and lowest price: What the Global Fund requires for buying medicines (Sept. 2003).
[118] See, generally, Report of the Third Board Meeting, 10-11 October 2002, GF/B4/2; Report of the Fourth Board Meeting, 29-31 January 2003, GF/B5/2; Guidelines for Proposals, The Global Fund, March 2003; Report of the Portfolio Management and Procurement Committee to the 5th Board Meeting, GF/B5/9. Of course, the basic procurement price is only part of the total cost of procuring and delivering the medicine to end-users. Other elements can add significantly to actual costs: freight/shipping, insurance, registration, quality assurance, storage, internal transportation, dispensing, administration, distribution costs charged by intermediaries, duties, tariffs, and national and local taxes.
[119] Report of the Portfolio Management and Procurement Committee, GF/B4/7 (Fourth Board Meeting, Geneva, 29-31 January 2003). Although the PMC recommended up to a 15% price premium, this recommendation was no adopted, meaning that recipients must continue to source at lowest cost.
[120] World Bank Group, Bidding for Goods and Works Contracts, <http://www.worldbank.org.ru/eng/
constant/answer4.html> (2003).
[121] See Report of the Fourth Board Meeting, supra note 118.
[122] See Green Light Committee <http://www.who.int.gtb/policyrd/DOTSplus.htm> .
[123] For the purposes of this policy a stringent drug regulatory authority is defined as a regulatory authority in one of the 28 countries which is either a PIC/S and/or ICH member
[124] See The Portfolio Management and Procurement Committee recommendation at the Sixth Board Meeting, Chiang Mai, 15-17 October 2003, GF/B6/9.
[125] WHO pre-qualification will not replace the requirement of in-country registration, but it should help fill a capacity gap in low-income countries that have difficulty independently assessing quality of medicines and manufacturers’ adherence to Good Manufacturing Practice. The frequently updated list of pre-qualified medicines is not binding on governments, but it does provide evidence-based quality assessments of manufacturers and of key medicines. See <http://www.who.int/medicines/organization/gsm/activities/
pilotproc/pilotprocmain.shtml>.
[126] The ICH brings together the regulatory authorities from the United States, the European Union and Japan. See <http://www.ich.org>. The IPC/S is comprised of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. See <http://www.picscheme.org/overview/picsauth.htm>.
[127] WHO, Substandard and counterfeit medicines, Fact Sheet no. 275 (Nov. 2003).
[128] This option, even if it exists, would be subject the Global Fund’s principle of additionality, which requires countries to maintain or expand current fiscal commitments to the health sector. Thus, countries would at the very least have to appropriate additional funds to pay the price differential.
[129] Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease is reported as saying that there will not likely be any “direct purchase” of generic drugs. “It’s likely we will try to get the best possible price from drug companies … for ‘classic drugs,’ where the efficacy is proven and the quality we are sure of.” He nonetheless acknowledged that there might still be an opening for indirect purchases by local programs that buy generics directly through lawful sources. Sabin Russell, AIDS relief showcase of Bush’s Africa tour: Critics wary of funding level, focus on abstinence, San Francisco Chronicle (July 7, 2003). Attacking the quality of generics has been a long-term strategy of PhRMA, which has used the twin-icons of piracy and substandard-quality to demonize the generic industry.
[130] The typology established by UNIDO (1980) differentiated production based on differences in the source of the finished product: (1) packaging of already formulated medicines and perhaps small-scale local production of formulations such as IV fluids; (2) formulation of drugs in final dosage form and perhaps some production from imported intermediates; (3) production from imported intermediates and manufacture of other intermediates from local materials, and (4) production of active substances and processing to produce the required dosage forms. An alternative typology differentiates (1) integrated corporations engaged in all stages of production and capable or generating new molecular entities for distribution through subsidiaries and licenses, (2) innovative companies typically producing off-patent medicines but capable of some innovation, and (3) reproductive firms that rely entirely on active pharmaceutical ingredients procured from others. See, Warren Kaplan, “Local Production”: Industrial Policy and Access to Medicines: An Overview of Key Concepts, Issues, and Opportunities for Future Research, World Bank Meeting on the Role of Generics and Local Industry in Attaining the Millennium Development Goals in Pharmaceuticals and Vaccines (June 24, 2003).
The pharmaceutical manufacturing process, depending on the end product, includes chemical synthesis, fermentation, extraction of organic chemicals from vegetative sources or animal tissues, and formulation into dosage forms such as tablets, capsules, injectable solutions, ointments, etc. and packaging in bottles, blister packs, etc. Id.
[131] U.S. Statement at TRIPS Council Meeting, IP/C/M/31 (June 20, 2001).
[132] WT/DS114/R, 17 March 2000.
[133] ¶ 4.38(a).
[134] Kaplan, supra note 130, at 5-6.
[135] Id. at 8.
[136] Id. at 9.
[137] Warren A. Kaplan et al., Draft: Is Local Production of Pharmaceuticals A Way to Improve Pharmaceutical Access in Developing and Transitional Countries? Setting a Research Agenda,, 44 (April 23, 2003).
[138] Id. at 45.
[139] Id. at 51.
[140] See, e.g., Bill Haddad, Chairman/CEO, Biogenerics, Inc, Presentation, World Bank Meeting on the Role of Generics and Local Industry in Attaining the Millennium Development Goals in Pharmaceuticals and Vaccines (June 23-24, 2003).
[141] On November 4, 2002, United States Trade
Representative Robert B. Zoellick formally notified Congressional leaders of
the Administration's intent to initiate negotiations for a free trade agreement
with the nations of the South African Customs Union: Botswana, Lesotho,
Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland. With respect to intellectual property
rights, the negotiations would:
-- Seek to establish standards that reflect a standard of protection
similar to that found in U.S. law and that build on the foundations established
in the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs
Agreement) and other international intellectual property agreements, such as
the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and Performances
and Phonograms Treaty, and the Patent Cooperation Treaty.
-- Establish
commitments for SACU countries to strengthen significantly their domestic
enforcement procedures, such as by ensuring that government agencies may
initiate criminal proceedings on their own initiative and seize suspected
pirated and counterfeit goods, equipment used to make or transmit these goods,
and documentary evidence. Seek to strengthen measures in SACU countries that
provide for compensation of right holders for infringements of intellectual
property rights and to provide for criminal penalties under the laws of SACU
countries that are sufficient to have a deterrent effect on piracy and
counterfeiting.
USTR Resources, Letter from Robert Zoellick to Senator Byrd
<http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2002/11/
2002-11-04-SACU-byrd.PDF>
(Nov. 5, 2002).
[142] There are reports from U.S./Moroccan negotiations that the U.S. is now seeking 20 years of patent protection from the date of registration with the national drug registration agency. If true, this could end up in patent terms of 30 or more years.
[143] PhRMA 2003 Annual 301 Report to the USTR, 71.
[144] Exports would still be permitted where there has been a competition violation pursuant to Article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement.
[145] The U.S.T.R.’s pursuit of heightened intellectual property rights is not limited to formal trade agreements. It has recently used its Special 301 Priority Watch List power against Guatemala which thereafter passed stringent data protection legislation. Similarly, the U.S. required Cambodia to become TRIPS compliant in 2003 instead of 2016, as a condition of its entry to the WTO.
[146] These intellectual property negotiation objectives
directly violate the principal negotiating objectives in the Trade Act of 2002,
which require the U.S. " to respect the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health, adopted by the World Trade Organization at the Fourth Ministerial
Conference at Doha, Qatar on November 14, 2001." 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(4)(C) (2002). Similarly, by seeking TRIPS-plus provisions found in U.S. law,
the U.S. Trade Representative is also directly violating Executive Order 13155,
3 C.F.R. 268, supra note 36.
[147] Richard Elliott, TRIPS and Rights: International Human Rights Law, Access to Medicines and the Interpretation of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property <http://www.aidslaw.ca/Maincontent/issues/cts/briefs/TRIPS-human-rights-briefPDF.pdf> (Nov. 2001) (prepared for the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network and the AIDS Law Project of South Africa)
[148] Kaplan, et al., supra note 130, at 8-9.
[149] In May of 2000 the combination of d4T/3TC/nevirapine was $10,439/patient/year. J. F. Wilson, Building Africa AIDS Care From the Ground Up, 139 Ann. Intern. Med. 157-160 (2003).
[150] See James Boyle, special editor, Symposium, The Public Domain, 66 Duke J. Law & Cont. Problems (2003); James Love. Benefits of a treaty on R&D. Session on alternative frameworks to finance R&D, The Drugs for Neglected Diseases (DND) Working Group, Rio de Janerio, Brazil <http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2002-December/003797.html> (December 3, 2002); Royal Society, Keeping Science Open: The Effect of Intellectual Property Policy on the Conduct of Science <http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/files/statfiles/document-221.pdf> (2003); John Sulston, The Heritage of Humanity, LeMonde Diplomatique <http://mondediplo.com/2002/12/15genome> (Dec. 2002) (discussing decisions not to patent the human genome). Certain elements of such an approach are underway. See, Medecins Sans Frontieres Access to Essential Medicines Campaign and the Drugs for Neglected Disease Working Group, Fatal Imbalance: The Crisis in Research and Development for Drugs for Neglected Diseases (Sept. 2001); cf. Luis Jodar, F. Marc LaForce, Constante Ceccarini, Teresa Aguado, Dan M. Granoff, Menigococcal conjugate vaccine for Africa: a model for development of new vaccines for the poorest countries, Lancet <http://image.thelancet.com/extras/02art7254web.pdf> (April 1, 2003).